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Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) has been the focus of Department of Defense 
efforts to reduce the cost of maintaining weapons systems for nearly two decades. 
Through an investigation of the MH-60S helicopter, this paper uses a gap analysis 
framework to determine the value of increasing CBM usage. 
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) has used scheduled 
inspections as the backbone of aviation maintenance since 1959. The most significant of 
these inspections is the phase cycle, which provides inspection of aircraft components 
based on flight hours. This study uses the MH-60S to conduct a capability gap analysis 
for CBM in naval aviation.  Through the use of a JCIDS Capabilities Based Assessment, 
the capability gap between the CBM enabling IMD-HUMS and the NAMP phase cycle is 
determined.  From this gap analysis, Earned Value Management (EVM) tools determine 
the value of closing the CBM capability gap between the phase maintenance and IMD-
HUMS in terms of cost and safety. Finally, an alternative phase maintenance structure is 
proposed for MH-60S maintenance which leverages the CBM capabilities of the IMD-
HUMS to reduce total lifecycle costs. 
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The cost of developing and maintaining weapons systems has become a central focus of 
managers within the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years.  Following the 
downsizing of the U.S. military after the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, all 
communities within the DOD have been forced to find ways to reduce the cost of doing 
business.  The U.S. Navy has expressed a desire for nearly two decades to streamline the 
maintenance process for weapons systems through the use Condition-Based Maintenance 
(CBM) to reduce lifecycle costs.  Within Naval Aviation, a series of tools, such as the 
Goodrich Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic-Health Usage Management System (IMD-
HUMS), have been developed to enable greater CBM capability.   
To date, this CBM capability has not been fully implemented, and aviation 
maintenance is still based upon inspection cycles.  The continued reliance on this 
decades-old maintenance program and its use of inspections has created a substantial 
capability gap in relation to the desired CBM capability.  This study applied a capability 
gap analysis to the current Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) using the MH-
60S helicopter as its focus.  The focus of this study was on the phase inspection process, 
which serves as the backbone of the current NAMP.  Through the use of a JCIDS 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), the CBM capability gap was assessed and an 
alternative maintenance process using CBM in the MH-60S was proposed.  
The results of the study show that Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic System 
(IMDS) is capable of supporting a more robust CBM capability using data currently 
collected from aircraft.  IMDS was also found to provide no statistically significant 
capability in its current usage other than a slight reduction in functional check flight 
(FCF) flight hours.  The alternative phase model attempted to evolve the current phase 
model through the introduction of CBM.  The alternative case keeps phase inspections in 
place at the same intervals as the current process, but with a greatly reduced number of 
component inspections.  The inspections removed from the phase process involve engine, 
rotor and drive train systems which are currently monitored by IMDS.  The comparison 
 xviii 
of the baseline and alternative models revealed a significant value to implementing 
greater CBM.   
 The primary goal of this study was to create a baseline of current maintenance 
performance in the MH-60S and use a capability gap analysis to create a CBM 
alternative.  Using the work of Langford and Franck (2009) on the application of Value 
Engineering and Earned Value Management (EVM) to Gap Analysis, the value of closing 
the CBM gap within the MH-60S maintenance process was determined.  The study used 
data collected from a sampling of aircraft from the Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Pacific 
(HSCWP) from July 2013 to August 2014.   
Using measures of performance related to maintenance labor hours, flight hours, 
availability and flight safety, the baseline case was created for maintenance performance.  
A series of comparisons was made between aircraft both equipped with the CBM 
enabling IMDS system and aircraft without IMDS.  These comparisons were used to 
determine the value of IMDS as currently used in the fleet.  Following the construction of 
the baseline case, IMDS ground station data was used to determine the efficacy of IMDS 
to implement CBM capabilities.  Using this information, an alternative phase inspection 
scheme was created that used CBM to replace phase inspections of IMDS monitored 
systems.  This alternative phase was then compared to the baseline case to determine the 
value of closing the CBM capability gap using the work of Langford and Franck (2009).  
Finally, flight safety data was used to help determine the possible effects of decreased 
human inspection on aircraft mechanical failures. 
The study assessed value based on the number of flight hours available per labor 
hour during phase inspections.  This value increased from 0.35 flight hours per phase 
labor hour under the baseline model to an average of 1.07 flight hours per phase labor 
hour with the alternative phase model.  Additionally, the reduction of post-phase 
vibration analysis through only need-based inspections of engine and drive train systems 
increased available flight hours by 3.24 percent.  This increase was a direct result in the 
virtual elimination of post-phase FCFs due to changes in the phase inspection process. 
 xix 
Availability of aircraft due to phase inspection down time increased from an 
average of 69 percent to 93.7 percent.  This increase was mostly due to the reduced labor 
requirement during phase and the virtual elimination of post-phase FCFs.  Additionally, 
the study found that maintenance labor hours decreased by an average of 1,270 hours per 
phase cycle, or about 318 hours per phase inspection under the alternative model.  
Finally, the flight safety data revealed that in the period from 2009-2014, 60 percent of 
MH-60S aircraft incidents caused by mechanical failure were as a result of human error 
in maintenance.  The study determined that there was no evidence with the flight safety 
data to support any finding that the alternative phase model would compromise safety in 
a meaningful way.  Furthermore, safety would likely be improved by reducing the human 
element of maintenance, which was the primary cause in a majority of reported 
mechanical failures. 
 This study supports the Navy’s desired implementation of CBM into aviation 
maintenance processes.  A capability gap was identified within the current process, and a 
reasonable alternative to current maintenance processes was proposed.  This alternative 
model provides a significant value to the Navy and should be explored in practice within 
the fleet. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) 
has undergone a significant shift in priorities. Through the two decades since the fall of 
the Soviet Empire, the DOD has undergone a massive shift in focus away from the global 
conflicts that dominated the last century. After the events of 9–11, the DOD focused on 
combating terrorism and smaller scale, regional conflicts, which require a much different 
force to achieve success. After more than a decade of warfare, the United States has 
become a war-weary nation, and there are major questions about the future composition 
of the military. As the recent limited engagements in Libya have shown, air power is 
likely to be the key component of U.S. strategy with a lessened focus on ground forces. 
With this possible seismic change as the backdrop, the DOD must find ways to continue 
to execute its missions with greatly reduced resources. This resource-constrained 
environment will put stress related to both budgets and manning on all of the services, 
especially the U.S. Navy. The Navy will likely be responsible for developing new 
weapons systems while maintaining an active presence around the world. 
After more than a decade of war, the DOD faces significant changes to future 
manning and force structure. This point was outlined by Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel when discussing the Obama Administration’s FY2015 DOD budget proposal 
(Simeone 2014). In February 2014, Secretary Hagel detailed a series of “difficult 
choices” that must be made for each of the services since the overall defense budget 
would shrink by more than $75 billion by 2016, with larger cuts likely to follow 
(Simeone 2014). This budget reduction is at the forefront of every decision throughout 
the force and Naval Aviation was not exempt from the budgetary declines. As explained 
in Defense News in March of 2014, the proposed FY2015 Naval Aviation budget saw 
significant cuts for procurement and operations. According to the budget proposal, 
procurement budgets would decrease for the year by nearly $5.1 billion and operations 
and maintenance funding by $1.7 billion, or nearly 4 percent (Cavas 2014).   
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With the aging of its current fleet, the Navy must find a way to maximize the life 
of current systems at a reduced cost while developing new systems that will fight the next 
generation of wars. Over the last several years, the Navy has seen a significant reduction 
at all levels of the force due to processes such as sequestration and right-sizing. Many 
legacy systems still provide needed capabilities but require maintenance and logistics 
efforts which have become severely outdated. In this environment, commanders at every 
level, from the Pentagon down to the operational ships and squadrons, have been forced 
to rethink how resources are managed. This change in direction also begs an important 
question: How does the Navy find safe and effective ways to employ current systems at a 
reduced cost? 
To answer this critical question, an investigation of current processes is necessary 
in order to determine the best use of current and future resources. However, a single 
study cannot analyze every process throughout the Navy, as it has a diverse set of sea, air, 
and land-based systems. Instead, this study was limited, with clearly defined boundaries 
and focused on specific processes that can assist individual commanders in improving 
their own organization. This study focused on the operational aviation squadron, which 
serves as the smallest autonomous unit within the naval aviation enterprise. Research was 
confined to helicopter squadrons and the maintenance processes involving the MH-60S 
helicopter. This study attempted to determine the suitability of maintenance processes to 
operate in current and future resource-restrained environments. To achieve this goal, an 
analysis of capabilities was performed, gaps in capabilities were identified, and possible 
solutions were explored in order to determine how to best employ the MH-60 in the 
immediate future. This study’s results will remain valid for the time period where 
calendar-based maintenance serves as the primary method of maintaining naval aircraft. 
A shift in maintenance to a Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) program would go 
beyond the scope of this investigation and make its conclusions obsolete. 
B. SCOPING THE MAINTENANCE COST PROBLEM 
In the face of impending budget cuts, it is important to find ways to reduce costs 
without degrading or eliminating the capabilities of current systems. To resolve this issue, 
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it is important to analyze the current operations and maintenance structure of naval 
aircraft. Currently, all naval aviation units adhere to a single maintenance structure 
known as the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP), which standardizes 
corrective and preventive maintenance processes fleet-wide. This program is explored to 
determine where improvements can be made and what tools are available to implement 
these changes. 
The NAMP, officially known as the OPNAVINST 4790.2 series, was introduced 
in 1959 and was the first attempt to standardize maintenance processes throughout naval 
aviation. The NAMP has undergone a series of revisions in the last five decades, with the 
most recent release occurring in May 2012 (Commander Naval Air Forces 
[COMNAVAIRFOR] 2012). Even though changes have been made to the program, the 
overall structure has remained essentially unchanged from the first version released over 
five decades ago. The NAMP divides all maintenance efforts into three levels, 
operational, intermediate and depot, and assigns specific tasks to each level as 
appropriate (COMNAVAIRFOR 2012).  
The operational level (O-level) refers to the day-to-day maintenance efforts of the 
operational unit that typically serves as the reporting custodian for the aircraft. In simpler 
terms, the operational level refers to maintenance performed by the unit, most typically a 
squadron or air wing, which operates the aircraft. The intermediate and depot levels refer 
to higher levels of maintenance that focus on inspecting and repairing equipment that 
cannot be maintained at the operational level. Intermediate and depot levels are also 
responsible for conducting maintenance related to improving and extending the service 
life of aircraft and support equipment (COMNAVAIRFOR 2012). For the purposes of 
this paper, the focus is on the operational level, as this is where a majority of the 
maintenance actions are conducted and most of the manpower is concentrated.   
The NAMP details seven maintenance functions generally performed at the O-
level: inspections, servicing, handling, on-equipment preventive and corrective 
maintenance, incorporation of technical directives, record keeping and Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM) implementation (COMNAVAIRFOR 2012). One 
important note is the interaction of RCM and Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM). 
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CBM is discussed in length in this study and is the primary enabler of the RCM concept 
discussed in the NAMP. For simplicity sake, CBM shall be used throughout this study to 
refer to all principle related to both CBM and RCM.  
Regardless of the type of maintenance, most O-level preventive maintenance 
functions are based on time cycles or the number of flight hours flown. Preventive 
maintenance at the O-level is centered on individual aircraft, so each airframe has its own 
set of requirements for inspections and maintenance actions. Some actions are scheduled 
based on the amount of time since the previous inspection and others on the number of 
hours flown or type of flight that was conducted. These inspections and the actions 
related to their completion form the backbone of O-level maintenance. Corrective 
maintenance actions are driven greatly by the results of these preventive maintenance 
inspections and the operational usage of aircraft components. The NAMP and its 
requirements will be explored in greater depth in following sections. 
Having established the current state of naval aviation and its short and long-term 
need to reduce costs, this paper focuses on the ways that maintenance processes can be 
improved to save both resources and labor hours. The goal of this research is to find an 
effective measure of the usefulness of current processes and identify areas in which these 
processes can be improved using a systems engineering framework. To accomplish this 
goal, a capability gap analysis was conducted to determine, as Langford et al. (2007) 
noted, “the degree to which a current system satisfies a set of requirements.” In Chapters 
II-IV, the current state of aviation maintenance is detailed, the use of condition-based 
maintenance is described, and gap analysis is defined and conducted for the MH-60S. 
The current NAMP, however, does not meet all of the performance goals outlined 
above. As is discussed in Chapter II, the current NAMP does meet the needs of the 
aviation force in terms of providing required warfighting capabilities. However, the 
NAMP does not meet the goals laid out in the Naval Aviation Vision 2020 or DOD and 
OPNAV directives with respect to condition-based maintenance. These issues are 
explored in depth in Chapter III, as the failure of the NAMP in its current form to meet 
CBM goals is a major driver of this research.  
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This study attempts to answer the following four questions directly related to the 
continued safe and effective operation of naval aircraft:  
1. How can naval aviation commanders improve the aircraft maintenance 
process at the organizational level in order to meet increasing operational 
requirements in a time of decreasing budgets?  
2. What tools are available that can reduce the manpower and equipment 
requirements for operational squadrons, how effective are these tools, and 
are they being used to the greatest extent possible?  
3. To what extent is there a gap between current capabilities and the 
requirement to meet the Navy’s stated goal of maximizing the use of CBM 
at the organizational level?  
4. Are there any possible solutions that may have been overlooked that could 
be more effective than the maintenance processes currently in use or 
development?  
Through answering these questions, a capability gap analysis framework is developed 
and applied across Naval Aviation to meet the needs of both the DOD and public 
stakeholders.  
In order to answer these questions, Chapter II explores the NAMP in-depth, which 
an understanding of its components and determine areas where cost-effective changes can 
be implemented. In Chapter III, an investigation of relevant literature is conducted, a 
theoretical gap analysis framework is explored, and CBM tools and processes are 
discussed. Chapter IV presents the capability gap analysis based on the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and 
the relevant measures of performance and metrics. This capability gap analysis explores 
the research questions set forth above and constructs a systematic method for creating a 
viable alternative to the current NAMP process. Relevant data is presented, and the 
boundaries and scope of the analysis are clearly outlined and detailed. From this data, 
comparisons are made between both processes and aircraft, and the results of the analysis 
are presented in Chapter V. Finally, the formal conclusions of the study and possible 
extensions to future research are presented in Chapter VI. 
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C. APPROACH, METHOD, AND SCOPE 
Since the research goals have been established, the next important step is to create 
a research approach that applies logical, systematic methods to the subject and construct a 
clear scope for the investigation. The first steps are to provide the primary approach for 
the research, determine the affected stakeholders, and provide the perspective necessary 
to make the research questions relevant to the stakeholders needs. Once this research 
approach has been established, the methods and processes can be detailed and the scope 
of the investigation can be presented.   
The approach to this research is formulated from the perspective of the users of 
the MH-60S helicopter. The users constitute the most important set of stakeholders, since 
they are the ones most responsible for the daily operation and maintenance of the aircraft. 
The users are also the primary stakeholders responsible for the implementation of budget 
decisions and will be responsible for installing new processes. That is to say, since the 
users conduct most of the daily maintenance and all aircraft operations, they will be the 
stakeholders most affected by changes to the process that governs these areas. The users 
group, however, should not be taken to mean simply the pilots and aircrew that operate 
aircraft in flight. Instead, the users will be defined as the entire operational level 
squadron, including maintenance and support personnel that ensure proper aircraft 
operations. Since all members of an operational level squadron primarily focus on aircraft 
operations, even those acting in an administrative role, it is necessary to consider the 
entire squadron as users for this research. Therefore, this paper will frame decisions from 
the perspective of the user class. The research attempts to determine the value that users 
derive from processes and how this value might be improved through process changes. 
With the most important stakeholders identified, the next stage in determining the 
best research approach is to establish the value added by this analysis. The principal goal 
is obviously to maximize the benefit to stakeholders given the set of constraints that exist. 
To accomplish this goal, the following must be established:  
 How are benefits defined?  
 What are the constraints?  
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 How will benefits and constraints be quantified and measured?  
To answer these questions, a capability gap analysis framework was established to 
determine the value of process changes. The basis for this gap analysis has been derived 
from both the JCIDS Capabilities Based Assessment and the work of Langford and 
Franck (2009). Langford and Franck provide a method for determining the earned value 
of systems engineering, and the necessary value and worth equations will be derived and 
explained in more detail in Chapter III.   
Benefits and constraints are closely related, as both are denominated in the same 
terms. For instance, the constraints from the stakeholder’s perspective are the number of 
maintenance labor hours available and the budget for personnel and materials necessary 
for operations. Constraints are related to the operational commitments of individual 
squadrons, along with the equipment and physical space available to conduct 
maintenance and flight operations. Benefits are therefore measured in terms of the 
maximum use of constrained resources. This, in turn, is applied to the capability gap 
analysis. Through gap analysis, alternatives are created, the value of alternatives is 
determined, and areas where further engineering is required to achieve the necessary 
benefits are revealed. As with the research approach, the benefits and constraints of the 
stakeholders are explored in more depth in Chapters III-V. 
Having established the desired research methods, it is also necessary to explain 
why these methods have any importance to the stakeholders, as well as the reasons for 
limiting the investigation to a single set of stakeholders. The choice of capability gap 
analysis is important due to its lengthy history of use within the DOD on acquisitions 
projects, which consequently provides a stable comparison to other studies. Gap analysis 
is directly related to the principles outlined in the JCIDS manual (CJCSI 3170.01H) and 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DOD 5000 Series) (Langford and Franck 2009). By 
using this well-developed and understood framework as the basis for this analysis, the 
results and conclusions can be presented in a format that stakeholders throughout DOD 
can easily understand. Furthermore, resources are measured and denominated using the 
same metrics as the current NAMP processes, so a direct comparison of alternatives can 
be made and clear results determined. These comparisons will provide a greater 
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understanding of the results and conclusions throughout the naval aviation community, 
even to those with limited systems engineering experience. 
The final area that must be determined is the scope of the analysis, meaning what 
are the particular activities within the boundaries of the investigation? Although the users 
are not the only stakeholders that will be affected by changes to the aviation maintenance 
process, their activities define the scope of this investigation. A narrow scope is 
necessary because an investigation of the entire aviation maintenance process would be 
expected to be extremely dense and offer comparisons that might be quite difficult to 
understand.  
For instance, the Navy operates jet, rotary and maritime aircraft, which have very 
different maintenance requirements and are therefore difficult to compare directly. At the 
highest level of abstraction, such comparisons as “to maintain” are confounded by the 
lower-level details. Since each type of aircraft has diverse and different components and 
structures, the usage of maintenance labor hours should be expected to vary greatly 
across the different airframes. Therefore, a single airframe must be selected as the focus 
for the study. In this case, helicopters will be studied, specifically the MH-60S 
Knighthawk. The MH-60S provides an excellent basis for the study of maintenance 
processes, as there are currently multiple variants in service that employ different aircraft 
systems using the same NAMP processes. For this reason, data collected can easily be 
divided based on installed systems, which simplifies the comparisons that are made.  
As stated earlier, this study will also be focusing on maintenance at the 
operational level.  The operational level is the best place to investigate the maintenance 
process since it contains most of the maintenance manpower usage and all flight 
operations. Additionally, the operational level has been targeted by the Navy for the 
implementation of NAMP alternatives, such as the use of CBM. CBM is a primary focus 
of this study, since it serves as the preferred replacement for many processes in the 
NAMP (4790.16A 2007). Further, CBM has been the driver of multiple new systems 
built to ensure its capability, such as the Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics System 
(IMDS) in the MH-60S. Therefore, CBM is explored in great depth and serves as the 
primary alternative to the current maintenance process in this study’s comparisons.  
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Finally, the study will restrict its focus to the utilization of manpower and aircraft 
within the seven O-level maintenance areas established in Chapter 3 of the current 
NAMP (2012). This focus on the O-level allows for a comparison of process utility both 
within and between squadrons, with the primary focus being tasks related to phase 
inspections. The other areas listed still have significance, but inspections and preventive 
and corrective maintenance provide the best means of comparing legacy maintenance 
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II. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (NAMP) 
A. NAMP OVERVIEW 
The history of naval aviation is littered with stories of both bravery and despair, 
as men and women have fought and died in service through the air. After more than a 
century of naval aviation, there are still great risks posed to aviators on a daily basis. 
However, over the course of the last century, there has been a quantum leap in the safety 
and reliability of the naval aviation enterprise. The hallmark of this great advance in 
flight safety is the standardization of processes related to both flying and maintaining 
aircraft. Following the Second World War, the U.S. Navy made a concerted effort to 
reduce the number of aircraft mishaps, especially those causing injury, death or 
destruction of aircraft. In order to accomplish this goal, a series of changes was 
implemented to the entire naval flight process, which focused on standardization of 
processes for aircrew, maintenance and administrative personnel. For the purposes of this 
research, the focus will be fixed on the effectiveness of the maintenance processes. 
Therefore, a detailed exploration of the current NAMP must be carried out to lay the 
groundwork for examination of its efficacy and vulnerabilities in the modern budget 
environment. 
The NAMP contains an exhaustive description of all aviation maintenance 
processes and procedures, outlines the composition of maintenance programs, and 
delineates the responsibilities of each level of aviation maintenance. In essence, the 
NAMP seeks to govern the efforts of everyone involved with aircraft maintenance and 
guarantee that commonality is maintained across all platforms. This commonality helps 
to ensure that processes are identical, regardless of the squadron, wing, or depot 
performing the maintenance, and that procedures are applied identically regardless of the 
platform being maintained. The NAMP has created a level of standardization that allows 
maintenance personnel with specific expertise to work on any related system, regardless 
of platform. For example, an individual that specializes in engine maintenance may have 
spent the first 15 years of his or her career working on jets and jet engines. If a helicopter 
squadron requires an experienced engine mechanic, he or she can be reassigned to the 
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helicopter platform and the procedures for work are the same, even though the machine 
itself is different.   
The NAMP has been very effective in helping lower the Class A mishap rate, 
meaning accidents leading to death, serious injury, or serious damage or destruction of 
aircraft. This rate has been reduced from 83.3 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours in 1945, 
to 51.2 in 1953, to 1.89 in 2003 (Naval Aviation Schools Command [NASC] 2005). 
However, the NAMP is not without its detractors, as the basic process has changed very 
little since its inception in 1959. The NAMP does not meet the Navy’s current definition 
for best maintenance practices that is outlined in the OPNAV 4790.16A, CBM 
Instruction (2007). The NAMP itself even sets one of the operational level maintenance 
goals as the “age exploration (AE) of aircraft and equipment under RCM” 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013).  The use of the operational level to validate RCM, and in 
turn CBM, suggests that CBM is the preferred by the Navy over the current process. 
In an era of increasingly complex systems, the Navy’s strict adherence to standard 
processes, regardless of their fitness, and flexibility of manning have created parallel 
issues for the efficacy of the NAMP. On one hand, standardization helps ensure 
interoperability between diverse platforms and makes the entire maintenance process 
more streamlined. On the other hand, this standardization has prevented system specific 
maintenance processes from being developed. Additionally, it has slowed the progress 
toward the use of integrated maintenance and monitoring equipment that could help 
reduce costs and labor. Furthermore, although maintainers can move between platforms 
under the NAMP, the complexity of modern systems makes this transition very time 
consuming. For the author of this study, personal experience as a maintenance branch 
division officer has shown that qualified and experienced individuals often take years to 
achieve a level of competence on a new platform equal to their previous platform.  
To be able to answer the key research questions posed in Chapter I, a systematic 
examination of the current NAMP was conducted to form a baseline of maintenance 
processes that were used as a benchmark to measure possible alternatives. Since the 
NAMP is such an exhaustive resource, the focus of this research was narrowed in scope 
to the operational level of maintenance on the MH-60S platform. This scope does not 
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mean that other areas of the NAMP will be ignored, as the process is greatly integrated, It 
simply means that the majority of the effort will be focused at the organization level. 
1. NAMP Organization 
In Chapter I, there were four major research questions posed that seek to 
determine how future naval aircraft maintenance should be conducted. The first of these 
questions speaks to how operational commanders can improve processes in a time of 
increasing operational commitments and decreasing budgets. Finding a solution to this 
problem requires an understanding of the NAMP structure and contents. 
The current maintenance program, outlined by the NAMP, is used fleet-wide by 
all aviation squadrons. The NAMP has provided a level of standardization and 
commonality between platforms and communities that has allowed successful flight 
operations for nearly six decades. However, as discussed in Chapter I, the military as a 
whole is undergoing a reorganization that will require significant budget cuts to all of the 
services over the next decade. With the uncertainty of future funding for many programs, 
the NAMP might not be the best available option in the future despite its past success in 
comparison to its predecessors. Standardization on the level demanded by the NAMP 
requires a significant funding effort to ensure compliance with its myriad of regulations. 
Therefore, finding ways to lessen the regulatory burdens posed by the NAMP could 
provide a great cost savings in the future. 
With the impending shift in military funding, the discussion of the NAMP 
processes shall be focused on cost savings, as the program is quite expansive. In keeping 
with the scope of this study, the focus of this section is the operational level programs 
and processes used by MH-60S squadrons. Since the maintenance processes outlined in 
the NAMP include additional maintenance at both the depot and intermediate levels, 
changes at the operational level affect the frequency and category of these higher level 
maintenance functions. Since the operational level includes the majority of the 
maintenance effort and cost, it is appropriate to focus on this level along with a 
recommendation to extend this study to higher levels in the future. Therefore, the NAMP 
can be examined in the appropriate operational context for the purposes of this study. 
 14 
The NAMP is divided into chapters which each contain a single, unified theme. 
There are currently a total of 17 individual chapters in the NAMP that detail the 
organizations, responsibilities, procedures, and structure of the entire aviation 
maintenance program from the CNO-level down to the operational level. For reference 
purposes, the NAMP can be found in its entirety on the NAVAIR website, 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/logistics/4790. The purpose of the NAMP is outlined in the 
following text from the COMNAVAIRFOR, which details the objectives of the program 
from the top level: 
a. The objective of the NAMP is to achieve and continually improve 
aviation material readiness and safety standards established by the 
CNO/COMNAVAIRFOR, with coordination from the CMC, with 
optimum use of manpower, material, facilities, and funds. 
COMNAVAIRFOR aviation material readiness standards include:  
(1) Repair of aeronautical equipment and material at that level of 
maintenance which ensures optimum economic use of resources.  
(2) Protection of weapon systems from corrosive elements through the 
prosecution of an active corrosion control program.  
(3) Application of a systematic planned maintenance program and the 
collection, analysis, and use of data in order to effectively improve 
material condition and safety.  
b. The Naval Aviation Plan (secret) details logistics actions which will 
allow the maximum opportunity to achieve this objective.  
c. The methodology for achieving the spirit and intent of the NAMP 
objective is labeled “performance improvement.” Performance 
improvement is an “all hands” effort which focuses on service and close 
support to customers. As a primary prerequisite, the mission must be 
clearly understood and communicated to everyone in the organization. It is 
essential that all personnel know their job, understand their contribution to 
mission accomplishment, and are sensitive to customer requirements. New 
or improved cost effective capabilities and processes must be continuously 
pursued. Mutually supporting teamwork, constant communication, and 
compatible measures are critical elements for success. Performance 
improvement must be targeted to accomplish the following broad goals:  
(1) Increased readiness.  
(2) Improved quality.  
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(3) Improved deployability.  
(4) Improved sustainability.  
(5) Reduced costs.  
(6) Enhanced preparedness for mobilization, deployability, and 
contingency operations.  
(7) Enhanced supply availability.  
(8) Improved morale and retention.  
(9) Compliance with environmental laws, rules, and regulations. 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013, 1-4) 
This passage outlines the three system-level requirements of the NAMP: repair of 
equipment, control of corrosion, and systematic administrative oversight of the 
maintenance process.  To meet these requirements, a maintenance program as a whole 
must achieve certain material readiness and safety standards as set forth in the Naval 
Aviation Plan. Since the Naval Aviation Plan is classified, the specific metrics for 
material readiness and safety that are considered successful are not conveyed in this 
passage.  
On the other hand, any study of NAMP processes that propose alternatives, such 
as this one, must create measures of performance and metrics which apply to material 
readiness and safety.  Performance measures and metrics are discussed broadly in 
Chapter IV, but this passage provides guidance for developing the metrics that are used to 
measure performance. This passage goes further in saying that NAMP processes, and by 
extension possible alternatives, must be focused on constant performance improvement. 
The definition and intent of performance improvement is conveyed through the nine 
goals listed above. Using these nine goals, measures of performance related to the MH-
60S were created and applied to both current processes and possible alternative to form 
the basis for this study. Through the use of performance measures and metrics derived 
from the requirements and goals listed in this passage, the efficacy of maintenance 
processes and alternatives is determined. 
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2. Performance Improvement 
Performance improvement in many ways serves as the focus of the NAMP, but 
simply stating a need for improvement provides no means to measure it. Helpfully, the 
NAMP does provide seven areas that are used as a basis for comparison of performance. 
The seven areas of performance are: productivity, effectiveness, efficiency, quality, 
innovation, quality of work life, and budgetability. (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013) Using 
these seven areas along with the top-level requirements presented in the previous section, 
metrics are focused on the areas considered most important by the NAMP. The 
combination of these seven areas and the nine performance improvement goals from the 
previous section on NAMP organization form the basis for this study’s metrics and 
measures of performance.  Therefore, these seven performance improvement areas along 
with the nine performance improvement goals are the NAMP’s measures of 
effectiveness. These measures of effectiveness and performance along with associated 
metrics are discussed in Chapter IV and applied to the baseline and alternative 
maintenance models created in Chapter V. Having determined the stakeholders, 
requirements, goals, and metrics at the system level, the focus can now shift to the 
operational level and squadron specific processes. 
3. Maintenance Levels 
Chapter 3 of the NAMP provides the basic division of activities between the three 
levels of maintenance: depot, intermediate, and operational (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). 
The following section provides a focused mission statement of the division of labor 
between the three levels of maintenance: 
The NAMP, implemented through COMNAVAIRFOR, supports the CNO 
and the CMC readiness and safety objectives and provides for optimum use 
of manpower, facilities, material, and funds. The NAMP is founded upon 
the three-level maintenance concept and is the authority governing 
management of O-level, I-level, and D-level aviation maintenance. It 
provides the management tools required for efficient and economical use of 
personnel and material resources in performing maintenance. It also 
provides the basis for establishing standard organizations, procedures, and 
responsibilities for the accomplishment of all maintenance on naval aircraft, 
associated material, and equipment. (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013, 3-1) 
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This passage restates the goals provided at the system level and gives a clear 
statement of how these goals are translated to processes. To achieve this aim, the NAMP 
provides a description of the maintenance concept for each level and the actions that must 
be accomplished at that level. For the operational level, or O-level, the following 
overview is given:  
O-level maintenance is performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day 
basis in support of its own operations. The O-level maintenance mission is 
to maintain assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full mission 
capable status while continually improving the local maintenance process. 
While O-level maintenance may be done by IMA/COMFRC activities, O-
level maintenance is usually accomplished by maintenance personnel 
assigned to aircraft reporting custodians.  
O-level maintenance functions generally can be grouped under the 
categories of:  
a. Inspections.  
b. Servicing.  
c. Handling.  
d. On-equipment corrective and preventive maintenance. (This includes 
on-equipment repair, removal, and replacement of defective components.)  
e. Incorporation of TDs, less SE, within prescribed limitations. 
f. Record keeping and reports preparation.  
g. AE of aircraft and equipment under RCM (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013, 3-1)  
From this passage, the most important stakeholders are clearly the aircraft users at 
the operational level. For the purposes of this study, the term “users” will refer to the 
operational level aircrew and maintainers. Since ensuring material readiness and safety 
are the focus of the NAMP, O-level maintenance must ensure these two areas are met. 
Users, in the form of maintenance personnel, ensure the aircraft is in safe operating 
condition to meet operational tasking.  Users, in the form of aircrew operators, also 
execute operational tasking and benefit directly from the safety provided by maintenance 
practices.  For these reasons, users are the most important stakeholders at the O-level, and 
their concerns should always be the most important.  
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Using the NAMP guidance provided in the passage above, the seven functions of 
O-level maintenance are: 
 To Inspect 
 To Service 
 To Handle 
 To perform on-equipment corrective and preventive maintenance 
 To incorporate TDs within prescribed limits 
 To keep records and prepare reports 
 To age explore aircraft and equipment under RCM 
Since the users are the most important stakeholders at the O-level, these seven 
functions must be performed to meet the stakeholder’s requirements. The stakeholder’s 
requirements are not directly provided, but can be derived from the seven functions and 
the requirements of the NAMP at the system level. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the top-level NAMP functions are repair of equipment, control of corrosion, and 
systematic administrative oversight of the maintenance process. Translating these 
requirements to the operational level, the user’s requirements are “maintain operational 
capability,” “document maintenance actions,” and “ensure safe operation of equipment.” 
The first requirement, “maintain operational capability,” is met by performing the 
functions related to inspection, servicing, handling, maintenance, and TDs. These areas 
all detail how a squadron, the principle unit at the operational level, will maintain aircraft 
and support equipment in the condition necessary to meet operational tasking. The 
second requirement, “document maintenance,” is clearly met by the function “to keep 
records and prepare reports.” The final requirement “ensure safe operation of aircraft” is 
met by all of the seven functions, since performing these actions enables the safe 
operation of aircraft.  
The primary short coming of the current maintenance process is shown by the 
final function “to age explore aircraft and equipment under RCM.” As discussed in 
Chapter I, RCM is the enabled by CBM, which is not currently practiced at the O-level. 
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The purpose of this requirement is to explore the efficacy of CBM at the O-level and 
collect data necessary to implement the Navy’s desired CBM capability. Since CBM is 
not currently used as a maintenance method at the O-level, this function is not truly met 
and a capability gap exists at the O-level.  This study seeks to determine the value of 
eliminating this CBM capability gap. 
Reliability centered maintenance is the basis for CBM, which will be explored in 
depth throughout the rest of this thesis. In this case, RCM is presented as the only 
seriously considered solution to improve the maintenance process at the O-level. RCM 
might be the best alternative, but including a specific solution set within a requirement 
introduces an unnecessary bias to process of “performance improvement”. A more 
appropriate term in this case would be to “conduct age exploration of aircraft and 
equipment under alternative processes” and then outline a series of possible alternatives 
that includes RCM. Even though RCM may prove to be the best alternative, the robust 
series of performance improvement goals described at the system level should be less 
specific to allow selection of the best performance solution. 
B. NAMP PROCEDURES 
Having established the stakeholders, requirements and functions at the O-level, 
the NAMP provides the procedures to be followed to satisfy the users’ requirements. The 
primary maintenance procedures are provided in the NAMP Standard Operating 
Procedures, or NAMPSOPs. NAMPSOPs are detailed in Chapter 10 of the current 
NAMP edition, and are typically program-specific directives which detail the 
requirements for each maintenance program. For example, current NAMPSOPs outline 
programs such as quality assurance, discrepancy reporting, maintenance training and tool 
control. (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013) Each NAMPSOP serves as another level of 
decomposition in the aviation maintenance system, detailing the individual programs 
which exist at the operational level. From each NAMPSOP, more detailed descriptions of 
functions are determined by decomposing these top-level functions. These 
decompositions are equivalent to a detailed design effort in systems engineering. 
NAMPSOPs have a common architectural structure which is applied to all programs at 
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the operational level. This common architecture provides a structure for all existing 
maintenance programs, and serves as a template for the development of new programs 
which meet the “performance improvement” goals at the system-level. 
1. Maintenance Department 
In addition to the NAMPSOP, the architecture of the maintenance department is 
established with the NAMP. In this case, architecture refers to all of the operational 
processes that occur within a maintenance department to accomplish operational tasking. 
This architecture describes the chain of command within each maintenance department 
and the derivative work centers. The architecture of standardizes the flow of tasks within 
the maintenance department, with each individual work center reporting to a maintenance 
control (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). The work centers are sub-divided into the aircraft 
division and avionics/armament divisions (AV/ARM). Each division is then further 
divided into branches by aircraft system expertise (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). For 
example, all aviation electronics technicians (AT) are part of the avionics branch, which 
combines with the ordinance (AO) and electricians (AE) branches to form the AV/ARM 
division (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). Each division then reports to the maintenance 
control, which serves as the manager of all maintenance activities within the unit 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). Parallel structures for material and production control also 
exist, but these areas fall mostly outside the scope of this analysis and will be discussed 





Figure 1.  Maintenance Department Architecture Example. 
2. Aircraft Inspection and Repair Process 
The final portion of the NAMP to be explored is the aircraft inspection and repair 
procedures. Inspections and repairs are the most labor intensive portion of the NAMP at 
the operational level. Inspection and repair serve as the major sources of preventive and 
corrective maintenance. This discussion of inspections and repairs is not exhaustive, but 
provides a basic overview of both preventive and corrective maintenance activities. These 
areas serve as the baseline for the comparison of alternatives to the current NAMP that 
will follow in subsequent sections. 
a. Scheduled Maintenance 
Most of the preventive maintenance mandated by the NAMP is scheduled based 
on flight hours, operating hours or calendar days. The goal of each operational squadron 
is to minimize the number of concurrent inspections taking place at any time 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). For simplicity sake, the focus remains on the two primary 
scheduled maintenance regimes covered in this thesis: special inspections and phase 
inspections.  Special inspections are primarily related to elapsed time, flight hours, or 
cycles of events. The specific tasks carried out on each special inspection depend on the 
platform being inspected, but the time interval for special inspections are constant across 
all airframes (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). Table 1 includes the MH-60S specific special 
inspections and their intervals. 
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Table 1.   MH-60S Special Inspections (after NAVAIR 2013). 
7 Day 56 Day 360 Day 546 Day 525 Hour 
14 Day 112 Day 364 Day 728 Day 700 Hour 
28 Day 180 Day 365 Day 30 Hour 1000 Hour 
30 Day 224 Day 448 Day 60 Hour  
 
In addition to these inspections that are based on time intervals, phase inspections 
are conducted at regular intervals to inspect all aircraft systems. Currently, the MH-60S 
uses a 700-hour phase cycle in four inspections occurring once every 175 flight hours 
(Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR] 2013). The phases are labeled as A, B, C, and 
D, and Table 2 details the specific maintenance performed during each phase inspection. 
Under the current NAMP, all scheduled maintenance is divided into more 
manageable parts, with all aircraft components inspected once every 1000 flight hours or 
728 days (approximately 2 years). The NAMP also provides for deviations from the 
established cycles to accommodate continued operations when necessary 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). Additionally, maintenance schedules at the operational level 
are contained in the monthly maintenance plan (MMP), where each command details its 

























































Fuel Cell Ballistic Ring
IGB/TGB Oil Change
Tail Rotor Assembly and Directional Flight Controls




Power Available Spindle Cables








Utility Hydraulic System Sampling
Flight Control Bearings
Access Panels Removal and Inspection
Airframe Inspections (Cabin, Transition Section, Tail Cone, Main Rotor Pylon, Tail Pylon)
Disconnect Coupling
Tail Rotor PCR Bearings













Fuel Dump System Operational Check
Flight Controls
Main Transmission Chip Detectors
Windshield and Wipers
Flight Control Cables
Airframe Inspections (Cockpit, Cabin and Tail Cone/Pylon)








b. Corrective Maintenance 
Corrective maintenance frequency is established by the need to correct 
discrepancies to aircraft. The basis for the corrective maintenance effort is both the 
inspection process and the use of unscheduled maintenance action forms (MAF). 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013)  A MAF is a document that is initiated for each maintenance 
action, whether scheduled or unscheduled, and provides the necessary information for the 














































Main Rotor Elastrometric Bearings
Main Rotor Spindle and Hinge
HIRSS
Main Rotor Head Slip Ring
Main Rotor Functional Checks
Main Rotor Dampers
Blade Assembly
Main Rotor Spindle and Hinge/Hub Assembly
Main Gear Box Radiator
Main Rotor Blade Assembly







Tail Landing Gear Structure
Flight Controls
Main Rotor Damper System Drain
Main Rotor Damper System Drain
Main Rotor Blade and Damper Installation
Environmental Control System
Main Landing Gear
Tail Landing Gear Shock Strut
Main Rotor Head Sub Assembly
No Additional Inspections
Flight Control Mixer
Main Rotor Blade and Damper Removal




maintenance to be performed. For unscheduled maintenance, each MAF details the 
condition which triggered the maintenance action, the corrective action taken, and the 
person and work center used to correct the discrepancy (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). Each 
MAF contains more than this information, such as job number, system type, etc., but 
these details are outside the scope of this analysis. MAFs may be written by either 
aircrew or maintenance personnel, and are considered current records for the next 10 
flights on each individual aircraft. These MAFs form the record of all maintenance 
performed on an aircraft within the last 10 flight cycles, and they are further kept in 
historical record for at least 12 months after the maintenance action was performed 
(COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). The current system used by most commands to generate 
maintenance actions and manage the maintenance effort is Naval Aviation Logistics 
Command Management Information System / Optimized Organizations Maintenance 
Activity (NALCOMIS/OOMA). NALCOMIS/OOMA is currently in use at every 
squadron operating the MH-60S, and the specifics of NALCOMIS/OOMA system are 
found in the NAMP, Chapter 13 (COMNAVAIRFOR 2013). For the purposes of this 
study, it need only be recognized that NALCOMIS/OOMA is the extant organizational 
system, so it will not be explored in depth. 
Now that the relevant sections of the NAMP have been summarized, an important 
question must be answered with regard to this study. How well does the NAMP perform 
today, and what is the value of implementing the performance improvements that are 
discussed in the NAMP?  The answers to these questions speak to the relevance of this 
thesis and will help form the theoretical framework that will be developed in Chapter III. 
First and foremost, it must be determined if the NAMP is a useful process that meets the 
needs of the Navy. Second, since the NAMP provides its own amendment process, what 
most needs to change about the NAMP to ensure success into the future. Finally, since 
the NAMP favors RCM at the operational level as the preferred “performance 
improvement” solution, do RCM processes provide the best alternatives for the current 
processes. These questions are addressed in Chapter III, as they deal directly with the 
purpose of this study. In closing, it is important to note that the NAMP currently relies on 
the use of labor intensive inspections and repairs to meet the system-level needs of 
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aircraft maintenance. With the new world of constrained budgets and continued global 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With the recent draw down of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD has 
seen a shift in priorities and now faces many new budget realities. The needs to reduce 
both current and future budgets, as well as the requirement to continue the development 
of capabilities, have led to a series of studies involving weapon systems and associated 
processes. Within this context, a focus has been put on legacy systems, as the long 
service life of many systems creates a need to improve performance and reduce life cycle 
costs prior to the next generation of weapons entering service.   
The Navy in particular has examined this reduction in life cycle costs, as 
evidenced by the Naval Aviation Vision 2020. This publication, released in 2005, 
describes the future needs of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) and lays out the vision 
of the future aviation force in the year 2020. The NAE is said to be measured by one 
simple metric: “aircraft ready for manning at reduced cost” (Taylor et al. 2005). To meet 
this metric, the NAE put forth a focus on cost-wise readiness, buying higher quality 
components to improve readiness, reducing the time that systems spend in maintenance, 
increased reliability and implementing process efficiencies (Taylor et al. 2005). The NAE 
focus serves as the statement of need for all aviation systems and provides the metrics 
that determine the success of a system.   
The aim of this thesis is to determine how well the maintenance process responds 
to the need for aircraft designs that are ready for production at a reduced cost.  The 
objective, therefore, is to determine how well a legacy or developmental system satisfies 
this metric in relation to viable alternatives.  This chapter develops the viable alternatives 
to the current processes that were described in Chapter II.  The literature review explores 
the results of published studies that are related to the current state of naval aviation and 
present the theoretical framework for this study.  Through this process of reviewing the 
literature, a framework was created that related the need for this analysis, the tools used 
to evaluate alternatives, and the ways in which the results were evaluated.  This method 
creates a clear means for collecting data, evaluating results and interpreting conclusions 
that follow in successive sections of the thesis. 
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A. GAP ANALYSIS 
1. Necessity of Gap Analysis 
When considering the current state of the Naval Aviation Enterprise, it is 
important to understand both its present and likely future composition. As discussed in 
Chapter I, reductions in future budgets will force a change in the way Naval Aviation 
does business. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a large shift in the needs of 
the DOD as countering the Soviet Union was no longer the focus of American foreign 
policy. The composition of the armed forces changed greatly over the next two decades 
away from a European-centric strategy. According to the New York Times, by 2014, the 
number of U.S. troops had decreased from 400,000 during the Cold War to a current 
force of about 67,000 (Cooper and Erlanger 2014). At the same time, the number of 
aircraft had decreased from approximately 800 at the end of the Cold War in the early 
1990s to about 172 today (Cooper and Erlanger 2014). The cuts in Europe have left the 
Navy with fewer forces, numbering approximately 7,000 sailors and marines with no 
aircraft carriers stationed in the Mediterranean (Cooper and Erlanger 2014).  
Based on the nature of the geopolitical changes that took place between 1990 and 
2014, this shift was to be expected.  The shift in forces away from Europe also shows that 
plans for weapons systems need to be flexible and adapt to changing realities. Many 
weapons systems that form the backbone of the modern U.S. Navy were developed to 
fight the Soviet threat, including the H-60 helicopter. Modern weapons systems need to 
be able to be modified to engage threats that exist in the present that might not have been 
the focus of design decisions in the past. 
U.S. combat systems have required great evolution to meet a much different threat 
than seen even during the first Gulf War in 1991. The Naval Aviation Vision 2020 points 
out the change from the force composition during the first Gulf War to the forces that 
fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 93 percent of Navy and Marine sorties in 
Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom involved the use of precision guided weapons, 
which was a significant increase from the first Gulf War (Taylor et al. 2005). Due to this 
change to a more precise type of warfare, weapons systems have become more costly to 
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both acquire and maintain. As was discussed in Chapter I, however, there are severe 
budget limitations that will constrain the DOD for the foreseeable future. This dichotomy 
between the increasing cost of weapons systems and the decreasing resources available 
for their production and maintenance is the primary trade space available to military 
decision makers. 
The NAE has understood for nearly a decade that the cost of acquiring weapons is 
too high.  This fact is conveyed through the use of “reduce the cost of doing business” as 
one of its strategic readiness goals (Taylor et al. 2005). This statement is almost 
hopelessly board in dealing with the costs of equipping the military.  Costs associated 
with manning and acquisition decisions dominate the cost calculations of the military, but 
these are not the only areas where cost savings can be achieved. 
To reduce the cost of business, the NAE has focused on providing more capability 
per dollar in the fleet and increasing the efficiency of processes by both upgrading and 
modernizing the fleet (Taylor et al. 2005). The priority to modernize and upgrade the 
fleet has an enormous significance, since the entire fleet cannot simply be replaced with 
new ships or aircraft. One need look no further than the enormous cost of the F-35 project 
to understand that creating completely new aircraft systems is likely cost prohibitive in 
the current fiscal environment. The focus then shifts to ways to save costs using the 
people and equipment that the Navy already has. 
To achieve cost savings, changes can be made in the composition of the force in 
terms of people, weapons, and processes. Manning composition, although extremely 
important, is outside the boundaries of this study. This thesis will seek to find ways to 
reduce manning requirements, but questions related to how to best populate aviation units 
are not the focus. Instead, the emphasis will remain on possible cost savings achieved by 
altering the processes surrounding legacy systems. Through improving the efficiency of 
systems already in place, cost savings can be achieved today that allow for the use of 
greater resources for future systems.  
With this focus on cost in mind, legacy systems must be modernized in ways that 
both save costs and extend the system’s lifecycle. This modernization poses two 
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enormously important questions: how well is Naval Aviation meeting the goal of 
increasing efficiency in order to upgrade the fleet?  Furthermore, has the Navy 
maximized its use of resources today or do areas exist where resources can be conserved 
without a negative impact on combat readiness?  If the Navy has not used all means 
available to increase efficiency without a negative impact on combat readiness, then new 
processes and functions must be developed to achieve this greater efficiency. 
Table 3.   Naval Aviation Vision 2020 Strategic Readiness Goals. 
Strategic Goals 
Balance Current and Future Readiness 
Reduce the Cost of Doing Business 
Enhance Agility 
Improve Alignment 
Attain and Maintain Visibility Across the Enterprise 
 
Table 4.   Naval Aviation Vision 2020 Strategic Readiness Actions. 
Strategic Actions 
Prioritize capabilities, define requirements, and efficiently acquire and prepare relevant and 
optimally sized Naval Air Forces that satisfy our nation’s warfighting needs 
Operate with a common set of linked processes, each having an owner, metrics, and an action 
plan that drives continuous improvement 
Install processes that are repeatable, agile and predictive 
Manage performance and financial metrics as the common Enterprise language 
Execute a Continuous Improvement Program designed to define, measure, improve and control 
NAE processes, to include Human Capital, acquisition, training, and materiel readiness 
Develop quantifiable outcome metrics to measure our success and cultivate improvements that 
positively impact current and future naval readiness 
 
Since Naval Aviation seeks to become more efficient, how does the NAE plan to 
achieve the goal of “reducing the cost of business as usual?”  According to the Naval 
Aviation Vision 2020, relevant actions from Table 4 must be taken to meet the NAE’s 
combat readiness goals from Table 3 (Taylor et al. 2005). This combination of readiness 
goals and actions not only lays out the ways in which the NAE hopes to reduce the cost to 
train, equip and operate the fleet, but also provides the philosophical basis for this study.  
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In systems engineering terms, the six actions from Table 4 serve as the top-level 
user requirements that the NAE must meet to achieve success in “reducing the cost of 
doing business.”  The user’s requirements inform the analysis needed to determine how 
well each of these areas is satisfied by current processes and to identify shortfalls that 
exist. Therefore, a capability gap analysis is used to measure the fleet’s success in 
meeting the NAE’s requirements. Since this vision is nearly a decade old, it is also likely 
necessary for a reassessment of readiness goals, since the fiscal environment of 2005 was 
much different than that of 2014. Since the 2005 goals were meant to shape the force in 
2020, they still remain relevant today but their relevance is quickly approaching its end. 
Since the NAE has set the requirements for future success, it is important to 
understand how these requirements are quantified and success is measured. This 
understanding requires that the term success be defined in a way that can be measured 
and compared between possible outcomes. Since the NAMP, as discussed in Chapter II, 
focuses on creating a system of constant “performance improvement,” any measurement 
of success should be able to determine the value of improved performance. 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013)  However, performance improvement is a vague and 
there are myriad ways that improvement can be interpreted. Additionally, many of the 
variables related to performance improvement have competing interests, so no 
improvement scheme can assure unanimously positive results related to all aspects of any 
system. To maintain a narrow focus, the basis for this research is the writings of the NAE 
that set priorities for requirements. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the five strategic goals are put forth as essential 
ingredients for performance improvement across the lifecycle of aircraft development and 
sustainment. Furthermore, the series of strategic actions presented in Table 4 provide a 
basis for developing metrics to measure success and meet the requirements from Table 3. 
Therefore, an appropriate framework must be created that accurately applies the 
principles established in Tables 3 and 4. This framework provides the best way to 
measure the outcome of any performance improvement regime. 
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2. JCIDS Process 
The JCIDS process provides the means for determining what prioritized 
capabilities are required by operational forces. The following text from the JCIDS 
manual’s section on requirements identification and document generation provides the 
justification for gap analysis: 
Services, Combatant Commands, and other DOD Components conduct 
Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) or other studies to assess 
capability requirements and associated capability gaps and risks. In the 
case of Urgent or Emergent operational needs, the scope of the assessment 
may be reduced to an appropriate level to determine the capability 
requirements in a timely manner…Capability requirements and capability 
gaps identified through CBAs and other studies are traceable to an 
organization’s assigned roles and missions, and, to the greatest extent 
possible, described in terms of tasks, standards, and conditions in 
accordance with references bb and cc…Any capability requirements 
which have significant capability gaps typically lead to an ICD which can 
then drive development of capability solutions which are materiel, non-
materiel, or a combination of both. Urgent operational needs typically lead 
to a JUON or DOD Component UON document.  Emergent operational 
needs typically lead to a JEON or DOD Component UON document. 
(Department of Defense [DOD] 2012, A-1) 
For the purpose of this study, the Capabilities Based Assessment is used to 
facilitate the capability gap analysis of the MH-60S maintenance process. The specifics 
of the CBA are detailed in Chapter IV, with its purpose being to determine the extent of 
the capability gap related to CBM in the MH-60S. The JCIDS further explains how the 
results of a CBA should be used to drive solutions to close the identified gaps (DOD 
2012). Further, the selection of a single airframe, the MH-60S, is justified as the lack of 
CBM could constitute a joint emergent operational need (JEON).  For this thesis, the 
terms capability gap and JEON are defined the same as in the JCIDS manual 
(10JAN2012). Capability gap means the inability to execute a specific course of action. 
JEON refers to urgent operational needs that are identified by a Combatant Command as 
inherently joint and impacting an anticipated or pending contingency operation (DOD 
2012). 
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Any MH-60S CBM capability gap is emergent and not urgent since the current 
NAMP process is capable of maintaining the aircraft to meet operational needs.  On the 
contrary, the elevated cost in terms of man power and cost of the extant maintenance 
process does constitute a threat to future operations. For this reason, the capability gap 
meets the JCIDS standard for an emergent threat.  The JCIDS process and its application 
to the gap analysis are explored in more detail in Chapter IV. 
3. Value Engineering and Earned Value Management 
The MH-60S presents a suitable program for the study of performance 
improvement. It was produced with a series of variants, generally expressed with many 
additions to the airframe since the first release. All of the variants that have been 
produced are being operated currently, so comparison of the variants can be made. The 
first question is: what should the framework for making comparisons look like? The 
second question is: what are the most important comparisons to be made? The answer to 
these questions, at least in terms of the MH-60S, lies in the principles of value 
engineering and gap analysis, and the work of Langford and Franck (2009). 
In their discussion of Earned Value Management (EVM), Langford and Franck 
provide that the number one goal of EVM is to “suggest how management can obtain the 
best-value solution for the taxpayer’s money.” Furthermore, they define the application 
of gap analysis to EVM as such:  
If managers perceive a deficiency or a desired goal that differs from that 
which the actual work auspicates, there could exist a basis for gap in 
intentions versus what has been achieved, and, therefore, a desire to close 
that gap. The goal of Gap Analysis with regard to EVM is to maximize the 
difference in achieving cost-effectiveness by employing one (or more) of 
possible management strategies versus others out of the set of alternatives. 
(Langford and Franck 2009, 4) 
Since the goal of EVM is to determine the best value for the use of resources and 
gap analysis provides a way for managers to close the gap between desired and actual 
performance, Langford’s and Franck’s research speaks directly to the problem of how to 
measure performance improvement. Expanding upon this point, Langford and Franck 
explain that the difference between what a manager has in a project versus what a 
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manager wants in a project constitutes a “Value Gap” (Langford and Franck 2009). This 
value gap then is the difference between desired and actual performance in terms of what 
is important to the manager (Langford and Franck 2009). 
According to the NAE, the factors that are important to a naval aviation manager 
are found in Table 3. The chief goal when combining the NAMP and Naval Aviation 
Vision 2020 is to improve performance constantly while simultaneously reducing the cost 
of doing business. This improvement means that a process change can only be deemed 
successful or useful if it provides more capability for less cost, which Langford and 
Franck define as management achieving “more for less” (Langford and Franck 2009). For 
this reason, the purpose of any change in process must be designed to deliver more 
capability for less cost, and all changes should be evaluated on this basis.   
Although the evaluation of “more for less” seems like a simple proposition to 
apply, it is difficult to easily measure both the cost and capability provided by a change in 
process. This difficulty is due to the fact that many costs, such as labor, are not easily 
monetized in dollars used for a particular task. The Navy does not pay each of its workers 
on an hourly basis, so the cost of using labor is generally fixed for a given time period 
when the pool of workers is fixed. Therefore, the best measurement of cost is to calculate 
the amount of time that is used to perform certain tasks. If the amount of time, measured 
in labor hours, has an aggregate decrease as a result of a new process, then the process 
could be said to lower the cost of doing business. This assumption is also true of 
replacement parts usage, as any process that lowers the number of parts used can be 
considered less costly. In terms of capability, it is difficult to create metrics which can be 
estimated and compared to status quo processes. Therefore, capability can be measured in 
terms of both safety and aircraft availability, which can be reasonably measured using 
existing tools. In terms of the NAE’s vision, an increase in capability can be viewed as 
having more aircraft available for use at any given time while having fewer mechanical 
issues that compromise flight safety. 
With all of these standards in place, the final step is to find a framework for 
evaluating process changes that provides managers with the ability to compare new 
process ideas to extant processes. Langford and Franck provide such a framework, and it 
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can be tailored to meet the needs of this analysis. In their work on Value Gap Analysis 
(VGA), Langford and Franck propose the following application of VGA to manager’s 
decisions: 
By developing the theory of Value Gap Analysis into a form that can be 
applied in a clear and consistent manner for managers, (1) value metrics 
can be compared with Earned Value; (2) worth metrics can be applied to a 
critical examination of foundation data; (3) risk metrics can be used to 
interpret the relevancy of data; (4) an enterprise framework (which 
displays worth and risk metrics) can be used to illustrate context at a given 
time; and (5) assumptions can be scrutinized definitively. (Langford and 
Franck 2009, 11) 
Langford and Franck provide a further explanation of the ways that VGA can be 
applied to work in the following passage: 
We define Value Gaps in terms of the functional requirements, their 
performances, and their losses due to those performances. Further, all Value 
Gaps can be characterized in terms of capability of human capital. By 
reference, EVM was implemented to specifically address measuring gaps 
between planned and actual performance. But since not all performance 
gaps require a human capital solution set, VGA must be modified. Changes 
or enactments of policy, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, and facilities are considered candidates to close Value Gaps. 
These factors are usually formally evaluated before recommending the start 
of a new development effort. The result is that the process of managing 
work tasks is functionally decomposed to allow the assessment and 
identification of Value Gaps. (Langford and Franck 2009, 13) 
This excerpt in many ways provides the theoretical foundation for this study.  
Through a tailored process of Value Gap Engineering that focuses on changes to policy, 
any program can identify and close the gaps in attained value that exist.  Langford and 
Franck focus mostly on the ways in which a project can implement these changes early in 
the development process to create value during acquisition, but the principles of their 
research apply equally well to a program such as the MH-60S that has been in service for 
several years.  Langford and Franck provide a thorough discussion of value, worth, and 
risk and propose equations for both value and worth that can be applied to this analysis 
(Langford and Franck 2009). These equations, presented in Figures 2 and 3, provide the 
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basic relationships between the value, worth, and risk measures. Langford and Franck 
introduce the idea of quality affecting the value of a process 
 
Figure 2.  Value Equation (from Langford and Franck 2009, 16). 
 
Figure 3.  Worth Equation (from Langford and Franck 2009, 19). 
The value (V) of any function (F(t)) can be measured by the sum of all 
performances (P(t)) divided by the investment (I(t)) made in the function over any given 
time period (t). The worth of a system, defined by Langford as the value to include any 
possible loss incurred as the result of a given performance, is measured in terms of the 
product of the value and the possible loss function denoted by quality (Q(t)) (Langford 
and Franck 2009). To apply these functions to the NAE example developed in this 
chapter, value is the ratio of labor performance to investment, and worth is the 
application of this interaction to include the quality either gained or lost in the process. 
These two equations provide the general framework for measuring outcomes in terms of 
altering processes with the NAE framework that was previously discussed. In Chapters 
IV and V, the application of these equations to the MH-60S maintenance program will be 





Boundaries refer to the functional, physical, and behavioral limits of the research, 
and an understanding of each type of boundary is required as part of the Gap Analysis.  
As with any systems engineering analysis, the functional boundaries define the problem 
space and allow for the derivation of the physical and behavioral characteristics of the 
problem. With the functional boundaries of the study established, the physical boundaries 
can be explored to determine what physical components will be analyzed.  Finally, the 
behaviors of the system and its components can be discussed to determine the limits of 
what actions will be analyzed. 
1. Functional Boundaries 
In functional terms, this study was limited to an analysis of aircraft maintenance 
systems under the extant regime and alternative conditional-based maintenance structure.  
The NAMP explains the three top-level functional requirements for aviation maintenance 
at the O-level.  As was discussed in Chapter II, the top-level functions are: “maintain 
operational capability”, “document maintenance”, and “improve processes.”  As the 
discussion in Chapter II suggests, the domain of this research was the operational level 
maintenance practices.  However, the scope of this effort was narrowed further to the 
relevant functions related to scheduled maintenance as part of the NAMP.  More 
specifically, the Gap Analysis was bounded by the Phase Maintenance and Special 
Inspections functions.  These maintenance functional areas provided a means to inspect 
components and certify the airworthiness of aircraft based on time in days and the 
number of hours flown.   
Using the three top-level functions, the second level functions related to phase 
and special inspection can be derived.  From the top-level function “maintain operational 
capability”, the second-level functions of “determine system discrepancies”, “correct 
system discrepancies”, and “ensure safety” are derived.  The other two top-level 
functions “document maintenance” and “improve processes” are used to derive the 
second-level functions “provide monitoring capability”, “maintain record of maintenance 
actions”, and “limit resource usage.” By setting the functional boundary along these lines, 
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the research was then focused on how well any vetted maintenance process accomplishes 
these functions.  Since data on resource usage is available for both IMDS and non-IMDS 
capable aircraft, setting these functional boundaries allowed for a useful comparison of 
maintenance processes. Figure 4 shows the decomposition between the top-level second-
level functions. 
 
Figure 4.  Functional Decomposition. 
2. Physical Boundaries 
The physical boundaries of the analysis are limited to the physical systems found 
on the MH-60S along with the people and equipment used to conduct maintenance on the 
aircraft. Since the purpose of the NAMP is to standardize maintenance across all Navy 
aircraft, nearly a limitless number of comparisons can be made. Since each individual 
platform, i.e., jets, helicopters, and maritime aircraft, has unique maintenance systems, it 
is impossible to make relevant comparisons between platforms. Therefore, a single 
platform must be selected, which is in this case a helicopter.  
The Navy currently flies a single helicopter model, the H-60, but several different 
series variants with a variety of sub-systems and mission sets. For this reason, a single 
series, the MH-60S, has been chosen to limit the scope of the research. The MH-60S 
provides an excellent platform for study, as multiple variants exist, and all have the 
capability to support IMDS. At the same time, IMDS is not installed on all aircraft, so 
there is an excellent space to be explored between CBM capabilities and legacy 
capabilities. The physical boundary for CBM capability will be the on-board systems as 
Provide Monitoring Capability












well as ground support systems related to IMD-HUMS. The Gap Analysis will assess not 
only the gaps between legacy maintenance usage and CBM capability, but also any 
capability that is needed for CBM but not provided by IMD-HUMS. That is to say, 
determine the actions that IMDS can and cannot replace that are part of the NAMP. 
3. Behavioral Boundaries 
The behavioral boundaries are defined by the actions performed to conduct 
maintenance on the MH-60S based on the functions and physical objects involved with 
the maintenance as well as the lack of the required functions or physical objects. These 
behaviors will be limited to those conducted by maintenance personnel to perform the 
necessary maintenance functions listed above. The scope of behaviors is also bounded by 
the actions taken by operators to use the IMD-HUMS system effectively to achieve a 
CBM capability. Finally, the behavioral boundaries are defined by the time frame in 
which the actions studied take place.   
In this case, the relevant maintenance actions took place between July 2013 and 
August 2014 within the Helicopter Sea Combat Wing, Pacific (HSCWP). The time frame 
is limited to the actions conducted for one year since each squadron is required to 
maintain a record of all flights and maintenance actions for 12 months for each aircraft in 
their inventory. Three squadrons, one carrier based, one expeditionary, and one fleet 
readiness squadron will be analyzed. These squadrons constitute one of each type of 
squadron within the HSCWP, with each performing a variety of missions.  In total, these 
missions constitute all the mission sets performed by the MH-60S and provide an 
accurate cross section of maintenance activities. These boundaries clearly define “the 
who, what, when, where and how” of the gap analysis and clearly define the scope of the 




C. CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE 
To understand the possible gains that can be achieved by conducting a gap 
analysis and implementing value engineering to Naval Aviation processes, there must be 
an examination of both the current process and viable alternatives. The NAMP, which 
provides the structure of the current maintenance program, was discussed in length in 
Chapter II. However, the Navy has been focused on improving the NAMP for several 
years and has looked for a preferred alternative to the current maintenance process based 
on time cycles. In many ways, the Navy, as was noted in the discussion of the Naval 
Aviation Vision 2020 in the previous section, does not view the current process as 
sufficient to meet its future needs. On the other hand, the Navy does present a preferred 
alternative in the form of Condition-Based Maintenance. 
CBM has been at the forefront of the Navy’s effort to modernize its force for 
nearly two decades, and has become the primary maintenance goal for both new and 
legacy systems. With the introduction of the OPNAVINST 4790.16 series, the Navy 
detailed the scope of CBM activities thusly: 
This instruction applies to acquisition, logistics, and maintenance activities 
for new and legacy programs. CBM concepts all active and reserve naval 
ships, aircraft, and the systems associated with them, as well as the 
infrastructure that supports them… 
The purpose of the CBM strategy is to perform maintenance only when 
there is an objective evidence of need, while ensuring safety, equipment 
reliability, equipment availability, and reduction of total ownership cost. 
The fundamental goal of CBM is to optimize readiness while reducing 
maintenance and manning requirements.” (CNO 2007, 1) 
This statement in many ways serves as the mission statement for all maintenance 
programs within the Navy. This passage also helps to clearly define the boundaries of any 
weapons system and its associated support activities. Since the Navy has a goal for the 
future in mind, it seems that any gap analysis should be centered on this chosen path and 
assess where gaps exist and the value associated with closing these gaps. These issues, 
including the specific applications to the MH-60S and the boundaries of this study will be 
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discussed later in this chapter. However, a better understanding of CBM, its history, and 
components is required before an assessment of its efficacy is made. 
1. CBM Literature 
Since CBM is the preferred structure for maintenance programs Navy wide, it is 
important to review studies that have measured its usefulness. CBM is not only used by 
the military, but by other manufacturers in the private sector. For example, John Deere 
has converted from its legacy “periodic maintenance” effort, which is similar to the 
NAMP cycle, to a condition-based maintenance process (Deere 2014). Deere has used 
CBM to achieve “a maintenance strategy aimed at extending machine life, increasing 
productivity, and lowering your daily operating costs,” which mirrors the goals of the 
Navy’s CBM program (Deere 2014). A company simply stating that CBM is better than 
time based maintenance does not make the statement true, so an evaluation of current 
literature on CBM provides a much better understanding of the efficacy of CBM in 
general. 
The relevant literature provides two important points of view for CBM: the 
structure and goals of DOD CBM programs and the effectiveness of current CBM 
programs in meeting these goals.  First, the CBM programs were explored to gain a better 
understanding of the goals of the DOD and Navy for CBM programs.  Following this 
investigation of CBM programs, a more thorough investigation of CBM usage to date 
within the DOD was examined.  Although CBM is not exclusive to the defense industry, 
the focus of this study will remain within DOD systems.  Although some commercial 
programs could be relevant, the difference in performance standards for equipment 
between private companies and the DOD makes comparison to the MH-60S more 
difficult.  Therefore, the focus will remain on DOD CBM programs to maintain a more 
narrow scope for this investigation. 
Within the DOD, condition-based maintenance is most commonly defined as part 
of the CBM+ (CBM Plus) program. CBM+ for maintenance operations is most clearly 
outlined in two publications: DODI 4151.22 Condition-Based Maintenance Plus for 
Material Maintenance, and the Condition-Based Maintenance Plus DOD Guidebook. 
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DODI 4151.22 contains the policy and implementation guidance for all DOD CBM 
programs. This publication provides a higher level view of CBM than the OPNAV and 
AIRNAV instructions that have been previously discussed. The DOD policy guidance for 
legacy program maintenance is presented, which states that CBM should be “integrated 
in current weapon systems, equipment, and materiel sustainment programs where it is 
technically feasible and beneficial” (DOD 2012). This statement is particularly relevant 
to this study, as Enclosure 2 of the same document states that the decision to implement a 
CBM program is based upon “Continuous process improvement initiatives in accordance 
with DODD 5010.42” and “Technology Assessments” (DOD 2012). This guidance lends 
itself very nicely to assessment using gap analysis within the process improvement 
framework established in both the NAMP and Navy CBM policy.  
The other important aspect of the 4151.22 is the guidance provided to the 
individual services in terms of CBM implementation. In the responsibilities section, each 
military department is tasked with both reviewing the effectiveness of CBM programs 
and including CBM solutions for new and legacy system maintenance (DOD 2012). This 
section serves as the requirement for the Navy to develop its own CBM program and to 
make maximum use of CBM where possible. Additionally, CBM is used as the preferred 
method for all maintenance activities and the Navy is tasked with finding ways to 
increase the usage of CBM wherever possible. 
Expanding on the DODI 4151.22 guidance, the Condition-Based Maintenance 
Plus DOD Guidebook provides a more in-depth look at CBM programs and directives. 
The CBM Guidebook includes an overview of all DOD CBM efforts and establishes the 
necessity for changing the ways that maintenance has been done in the past. The most 
relevant section in this study is Section 6, Measuring Success (DoD 2008). Measuring 
Success provides metrics for both implementation and operation of CBM programs, 
including the most relevant ways to track the effectiveness of a CBM program already in 
place. More specifically, the following guidance in provided for measuring an operational 
CBM program:  
One of the key challenges at the DOD and Service level is to gauge and 
map how CBM+ is progressing. A common end state is improved 
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maintenance from the maintainer’s perspective as well as the warfighter’s. 
CBM+ implementers should track a small number of metrics over the long 
term to assess whether CBM+ improvements are enabling a more effective 
maintenance process. (DOD 2008, 6-3) 
According to the concept outlined in this passage, the MH-60S is nearly a perfect 
fit for an analysis of the progress of a CBM program. This fit is due to the fact that IMD-
HUMS has been implemented to facilitate CBM on some, but not all aircraft, and there is 
a long time frame of data collected that can be analyzed based on simple metrics. Specific 
metrics, such as labor hours or parts usage, can be measured using both a CBM capable 
aircraft and a baseline aircraft without CBM. These metrics will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapter IV.   
These references are not exhaustive in their coverage of CBM programs within 
the DOD. For the scope of this thesis, however, the combination of these CBM resources 
and the guidance in the JCIDS Manual provides more than enough guidance to create a 
useful evaluation of CBM capability. DODI 4151.22 and the DOD CBM+ Guidebook 
provide a framework for judging CBM programs that can be applied to the investigation 
of the MH-60S. The most important value provided by these CBM directives is a better 
understanding of what constitutes a relevant CBM study. A relevant study of CBM 
capability is one that applies the systematic application of metrics to determine a 
reasonable alternative that includes greater CBM capability. Armed with this information, 
each military branch can implement overarching CBM programs and individual weapons 
systems can be assessed for compliance with CBM goals. 
Condition-based maintenance has been positioned in DOD literature as the most 
important part of cost effectiveness maintenance processes in a resources constrained 
environment. CBM has been a large part of the DOD’s future vision for nearly two 
decades, but CBM has not yet become ubiquitous within maintenance departments 
throughout the military. The experience of the MH-60S in particular provides a great 
example of disconnect between the status quo and desired CBM end state. This 
reluctance to embrace CBM in practice is most likely due to the organizational inertia of 
the current NAMP. Everyone involved in naval aviation maintenance has used the 
NAMP for the entirety of their career, so conversion to CBM will require a change in 
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culture that has yet to occur. The Navy released its first CBM directive in 1998, but, as 
can be seen in the NAMP discussion from Chapter II, the conversion away from time-
based maintenance has yet to occur. For this reason, it is important to look at studies of 
the CBM process in use. These studies help provide guidance as to how effective CBM 
has been at meeting the resource savings goals that have been promised in DOD 
literature. Through the use of study, the value of CBM is determined and culture changes 
can be initiated. 
Before considering the results of past studies that investigated the effectiveness of 
CBM, it is important to note that this study uses a different construction for determining 
CBM efficacy than others cited herein. The work of studies conducted by Pandey and van 
der Weide, Wegerich, Coats et al., and Bechhoefer and Bernhard focused more on the 
engineering of CBM enabling systems. This difference in approach does not mean that 
studies similar to this one do not exist, but simply that CBM-enabling systems have been 
a greater focus that CBM processes in a large portion of the literature. It is possible to 
gain a perspective on the efficacy of CBM systems and data analysis techniques which 
have been used in other studies by viewing the maintenance systems as the systems that 
they are. From the systems perspective, the detection and report of a condition that 
manifests in a maintenance event represents the currency of knowledge about the 
aircraft’s well-being. From that systems perspective, the literature can be analyzed and 
evaluated for pertinent information that helps characterize the results presented. 
This lack of focus on process does not mean that other studies have no value to 
this investigation. On the other hand, little guidance is available from other engineering 
sources to help shape the design of this study, which relies more heavily on DOD 
directives for its construction. There has been significant study on CBM related to 
Operations Research which does involve the economics of CBM. These studies do not 
directly address the systems engineering aspects of process design, again limiting the 
direct relation to this study. Therefore, the approach for this thesis is informed by these 
other studies and combines elements of both engineering and operations research into its 
construction. 
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The idea that CBM is less costly than maintenance involving inspection cycles is 
supported within risk literature in regards to large, complex systems. In one such study by 
Pandey and van der Weide (2009), a comparison of preventive maintenance schemes 
based on constant monitoring and periodic inspection was made. In their work, Pandey 
and van der Weide attempt to construct a discounted cost distribution to apply to systems 
that are damaged by shocks or transients that occur at random times. The results revealed 
a lower than expected cost and failure rate of large systems which are approximated by a 
non-homogenous Poisson process when monitored with continuous inspection rather than 
with periodic inspection (Pandey and van der Weide 2009). For the MH-60S example, a 
non-homogenous Poisson process is the best approximation of failure rates that occur 
independently of the preceding failure (Pandey and van der Weide 2009). The 
maintenance data available for the MH-60S shows this principle to be true of component 
failure in helicopters. Therefore, the equations presented by Pandey and van der Weide 
may be useful in optimizing the MH-60S maintenance process.   
In addition to studies on the economics of CBM, the bulk of the research with 
close relevance to this investigation is found within engineering literature. These studies 
provide validation of CBM tools in practice and optimization of their use, including 
examinations of CBM principles and the IMD/HUMS system used on the MH-60S. One 
of the most important aspects of a proper CBM regime is how to best implement the 
necessary monitoring system. Since the goal of CBM is to reduce costs, a useful 
monitoring system must be reliable and as comprehensive as needed.  
Studies by both Bechhoefer and Bernhard (2005) and Wegerich (2004) attempted 
to determine the proper monitoring system design for military helicopters. Wegerich, 
working with data obtained from NAVAIR on H-60 gearboxes, developed the notion of 
construction and comparison on similarity-based models (SBM) for improved diagnostics 
(Wegerich 2004). Using the SBM models, the normal vibrations of H-60 gearboxes could 
be isolated, with only abnormal signals remaining and allowing for the detection and 
tracking of subtle faults (Wegerich 2004).  
In addition to Wegerich, a similar study on the AH-64 Apache helicopter by Coats 
et al. (2011) found that separation of fault signals from normal vibration levels led to 
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improved fault detection rates. The Coats study provides an improved process for 
monitoring system development that has led to better fault detection rates in the AH-64 
IVHMS-HUMS and similar systems (Coats et al. 2011). Bechhoefer and Bernhard 
applied a technique to determine a threshold for fault tolerance to the UH-60L helicopter 
that uses the same IMD/HUMS monitoring system as the MH-60S. In this study, the 
authors developed a way to create a threshold of vibrations that would minimize false 
alarm rates and provide a conservative detection capability for faults (Bechhoefer and 
Bernhard 2005). Finally, in conjunction with this work, Gauthier (2006) found that the 
introduction of CBM+ into H-60 engine monitoring systems required the minimization of 
false alarms to produce cost savings when compared to schedule-based maintenance.  
The most important lesson to be learned from these studies lies in the 
effectiveness of legacy health monitoring systems, such as IMD/HUMS, to detect faults 
before they occur. Well-developed systems exist to provide a robust system fault 
monitoring capability in helicopter engine and rotor systems, so it is possible to 
implement a CBM process. A CBM process can meet the needs of both the DOD and 
Navy CBM programs in terms of safety and reliability, and studies suggest that CBM is 
less costly in terms of labor and dollars than schedule-based maintenance (Pandey and 
van der Weide 2009). Conversely, much of the NAMP process is driven by the comfort 
of users who have achieved success for more than two generations using a standardized, 
schedule-based process. The current culture of Navy maintenance departments requires a 
more robust study of the tangible results of CBM tools to understand what can be gained 




For any CBM program to be successful there is a need to have a robust 
monitoring system to gather data and monitor component performance. This monitoring 
is needed because inspection must be replaced by another action that ensures the 
effectiveness of aircraft systems. Since the purpose of CBM is to eliminate the need for 
periodic inspections, any monitoring system must be able to ensure the safe and efficient 
operation of components achieved under legacy maintenance systems, such as the NAMP 
for example. The MH-60S uses the Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics Health and Usage 
System (IMD-HUMS) to monitor components and provide the operator and maintenance 
team with data related to component performance. To gain a better understanding of 
IMD-HUMS, the Vibration Analysis Manual Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic System 
(VIB-200) provides the guidance used by maintenance departments and operators for 
IMD-HUMS (NAVAIR 2010). The VIB-200 serves as the primary technical publication 
for IMD-HUMS operation and maintenance in the MH-60S. 
1. IMD/HUMS Components 
The VIB-200 contains robust descriptions of both the IMD-HUMS system 
components and operator instructions. Figure 5 provides a basic overview of the system 
as presented in the VIB-200, including all of the major system components that are 




Figure 5.  MH-60S IMDS Block Diagram (from NAVAIR 2010, 004 00-8). 
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Before beginning the discussion of IMD-HUMS components from Figure 5, it 
must be noted that IMDS and IMD-HUMS refer to the same system and are used 
interchangeably throughout the VIB-200. IMDS is the MH-60S maintenance 
nomenclature for the Goodrich IMD-HUMS system, as it is referred in other publications.  
The IMDS is divided into two separate major subsystems, the On-board System 
(OBS) and the Ground Station (GS) (NAVAIR 2010). As the name suggests, the OBS 
contains all of the systems that monitor the aircraft components and the GS provides data 
storage and analysis capabilities. The OBS is subdivided into an Integrated Vehicle 
Health Management Unit (IVHMU), Data Transfer Unit (DTU), and Multifunction 
Display (MFD) (NAVAIR 2010). The IVHMU serves as the hub for the system, 
containing a computer that is responsible for monitoring installed accelerometers, 
magnetic pick-ups, tracker signals and aircraft parameters (NAVAIR 2010). The IVHMU 
processes all of the data received from the various monitoring components and presents 
the information to the operator (pilots) through the IMDS section on the MFD. The 
IVHMU also saves all information on removable Personal Computer Memory Card 
International Association (PCMCIA) cards through the DTU. These PCMCIA cards are 
then able to be inserted into a reader at the GS for aircraft data download and analysis 
(NAVAIR 2010). For the sake of brevity, Table 5 and Figure 6 have been included to 
provide the OBS sensors and their location on the aircraft. Together, Table 5 and Figure 6 
provide a comprehensive description of the systems monitored by IMDS. 
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Table 5.   IMDS Accelerometers (after NAVAIR 2010, 004 00-7). 
DTU 
IVHMU 
Inline Remote Charge Converter (RCC), Cold Accelerometer 
Inline Remote Charge Converter (RCC), Hot Accelerometer 
Disconnect Coupling Accelerometer 
Disconnect Shaft Viscous (Pylon) Bearing Accelerometer 
Intermediate Gearbox Input Accelerometer 
Intermediate Gearbox Output Accelerometer 
Main Gearbox Port Accelerometer 
Main Gearbox Port Ring Accelerometer 
Main Gearbox Starboard Accelerometer 
Main Gearbox Starboard Ring Accelerometer 
Main Gearbox Tail Take Off Accelerometer 
No.1 Engine Accessory Gearbox Accelerometer 
No.1 Engine Aft Accelerometer 
No.1 Engine Forward Accelerometer 
No.2 Engine Accessory Gearbox Accelerometer 
No.2 Engine Aft Accelerometer 
No.2 Engine Forward Accelerometer 
No.1 Support Bearing Accelerometer 
No.2 Support Bearing Accelerometer 
No.3 Support Bearing Accelerometer 
No.4 Support Bearing Accelerometer 
Oil Cooler Axial Accelerometer 
Oil Cooler Vertical Accelerometer 
Port Driveshaft Input Accelerometer 
Starboard Driveshaft Input Accelerometer 
Swashplate Vertical Accelerometer 
Tail Gearbox Input Accelerometer 
Tail Gearbox Output Accelerometer 
Rotor Trim and Balance Uniaxial Accelerometer 
Rotor Trim and Balance Biaxial Accelerometer 
Rotor Trim and Balance Triaxial Accelerometer 
4G Vertical Accelerometer 
Main Rotor Magnetic Pick-Up 





Figure 6.  IMDS Accelerometer Diagram (from NAVAIR 2010, Figure 4A). 
The information that is collected by IVHMU and stored on PCMCIA cards via the 
DTU can then be downloaded at the GS for analysis. The GS is compatible with the 
Windows Operating system and provides the ability to collect and store data for analysis 
by maintenance personnel on individual aircraft (NAVAIR 2010). Table 6 contains the 
ground station capabilities for IMDS. The combination of the OBS and the GS provides 
the capability for the MH-60S to implement CBM. As can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 
5, IMDS monitors vibrations from the main rotor and tail rotor along with associated 
drive shafts. IMDS additionally monitors engine performance and aircraft parameters, 
and provides a robust feedback to the operator by using of exceedances displayed through 
the MFD (NAVAIR 2010).  
The combination of on-board systems allows the maintenance team to constantly 
monitor aircraft performance throughout every flight. Monitoring also provides feedback 
when a monitored system has exceeded operational limits or the aircraft has exceeded 
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flight parameters. This information is stored in the ground station after each flight and 
provides a complete record of aircraft system performance. Using this record, 
maintenance efforts can be tailored to the needs of each individual aircraft and 
maintenance can be performed as necessary when limits are exceeded. That is to say, 
maintenance can be provided based on the condition of the aircraft, which constitutes a 
condition-based maintenance system. The usefulness of the IMDS and its limits will be 
further addressed as part of the Gap Analysis in Chapter IV. 
Table 6.   IMDS Ground Station Capabilities (from NAVAIR 2010). 
Vibration diagnostic checks Usage Computation and Tracking 
Detect and display of exceedances Regime Identification and Tracking 
Strip Chart analysis Regime Identification and Processing 
Archive mission data Flight Operations Management 
Track engine performance Fault/BIT Display 
DTMU Initialization and Read Maintenance Management 
Operation Exceedance Pilot Debrief Operations 
Rotor Track and Balance Engine Performance Trending 
Strip Charts of Aircraft Data Display and Trending 
 
2. IMD/HUMS Usage 
IMD/HUMS is currently used throughout the HSC community, but to varying 
degrees depending on the squadron.  As of 2014, there are nine HSC squadrons in the 
HSCWP that fly the MH-60S, and each has IMD/HUMS capability.  Currently, the IMDS 
is not used by any squadron to facilitate CBM.  The number of IMDS capable aircraft in 
the squadron’s inventory, IMDS is used only to facilitate FCFs, daily maintenance, and 
collect data.  IMDS usage is described in the MH-60S NATOPS Flight Manual and the 
VIB-200, which are the major operator directives that currently exist.  Needless to say, 
IMDS usage is limited in its current form.  Instead, all maintenance is currently 
conducted in accordance with NAMP directives and follows the cycles as described in 
Chapter II. 
As discussed in the Boundaries section of this chapter, there are three distinct 
types of HSC squadrons: Expeditionary, CVW, and FRS. Each type of squadron uses 
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IMDS but the number of aircraft capable of employing the system varies by squadron. 
For this research, the data has been collected for HSC-3, HSC-8, and HSC-21. Each 
squadron uses the IMDS system differently. For instance, HSC-3 is an FRS squadron that 
has a total of 18 aircraft that have flown and undergone at least one phase cycle in the last 
year. Of these 18 aircraft, only five were equipped with IMDS capability during the time 
period of this investigation. At HSC-21, there were 10 aircraft flown, of which only 2 
were IMDS capable and none currently attached to the home guard at NAS North Island. 
On the other hand, HSC-8 has eight aircraft that met the same criteria for flying and 
phases and seven of these aircraft were IMDS capable during the same time period.   
Since IMD/HUMS capability is dispersed throughout the fleet unevenly, simply 
implementing the system in each aircraft is a major barrier to CBM transition. Aircraft 
can be retrofitted to include IMDS, and this is routinely accomplished as part of the 
Depot level maintenance process. That is not to say that IMDS is not useful to the fleet in 
its current form. Each flight in an IMDS capable aircraft is recorded through the 
PCMCIA cards and the data is stored through the ground station. Once stored at the 
ground station, the data is stored on a Citrix server and accessible to local maintenance 
personnel and the In-Service Support Center at Cherry Point, NC. This data collection 
effort is in compliance with the NAMP directives discussed in Chapter 2 for the 
collection, storage and use of data to improve processes. At this time, the data collected 
has not driven any changes in the structure of H-60 maintenance practices. 
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IV. GAP ANALYSIS 
One on the most important aspects of the modern DOD acquisitions environment 
is its focus on capabilities.  The JCIDS process makes clear that the focus of DOD 
acquisitions projects should be to prioritize capabilities and ensure that systems deliver 
these capabilities (DOD 2012). Therefore, the gap analysis framework that was 
developed in Chapter III focuses on determining the gaps that exist between current 
capabilities and desired capabilities.  Langford and Franck, as discussed in Chapter III, 
devised a scheme for evaluating the value of delivering these capabilities.  This work 
serves as the theoretical basis for the gap analysis of the MH-60S that is found in this 
study. 
Previous chapters established the current state of H-60 maintenance, along with 
the desired capabilities of both the Navy and the DOD.  It is clear that at all levels of the 
military that CBM is a desired capability, but there have been varying levels of CBM 
implementation to date. The current maintenance cycle for all DON aircraft is outlined in 
OPNAV 3110.11U, which details the use of the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI).  
Each Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft has a specific PMI cycle depending on the 
usage of CBM or calendar-based maintenance.  An example of a CBM aircraft is the AH-
W/Z helicopter operated by the Marine Corps.  The AH-1W/Z “Cobra” uses a CBM 
cycle and has its PMI is two 36-month cycles with maintenance cued from condition-
based needs (Department of the Navy [DON] 2013). 
Currently in the MH-60S, there is a fixed 36-month PMI cycle where identical 
maintenance is conducted on all aircraft due to the lack of CBM capability.  Not all MH-
60S aircraft possess IMDS, but aircraft are retrofitted with the IMDS system as part of 
depot-level maintenance. This study includes a total of six aircraft that have been 
upgraded with the IMDS system during PMI, as review of the aircraft maintenance 
records show.  Due to the necessity of having aircraft available for operational tasking, 
coupled with the cost of the IMDS system, an immediate IMDS upgrade of the entire 
fleet is not feasible.  For this reason, along with the changing operational and monetary 
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environment discussed in Chapters I and II, it is reasonable to characterize the lack of 
CBM capability as an emergent threat to the helicopter community.  
A. STUDY SUBJECTS 
Perhaps the most pressing question to be answered by any research can be posed 
as follows: who are we studying and why is the study needed? The answer becomes self-
evident after reviewing of the current state of affairs in the DOD. Due to the high cost of 
acquiring new systems and the reduction in available funding for DOD, it is necessary to 
find ways to make legacy systems more cost effective. As for the question, who would 
make a good candidate for a study on the use of Conditional Based Maintenance, the 
MH-60S was chosen as the platform for study for the following reasons, previously 
outlined in the first three chapters of this thesis. First, the aircraft has been designed for 
CBM capability but is not maintained using CBM currently. Second, the MH-60S has 
multiple variants that use the IMDS and variants that do not. Finally, there is a robust 
data collection system in place for naval aviation, and these systems allow for vast data 
collection and storage that allow for comparisons to be made within a gap analysis 
framework. 
Having made the choice of the MH-60S, it is important to understand the 
dynamics of the HSC community that flies the aircraft. The HSC community is composed 
of three types of squadrons, CVW, Expeditionary, and FRS. CVW is the aircraft carrier 
based squadrons that are the descendants of the Helicopter Anti-Submarine (HS) 
squadrons that have deployed on aircraft carriers since the Vietnam War. Expeditionary 
squadrons are the descendants of the Helicopter Combat Support (HC) squadrons that 
have accomplished combat and logistics support since the dawn of naval helicopters. 
Finally, the FRS is a shore-based squadron that serves as the initial training for all 
aviators new to the MH-60S. The HSC community provides a diverse cross section of 
capabilities and mission sets. With the waning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there 
has been a shift in focus for the entire community. The HSC community and the MH-60S 
would greatly benefit from any construct that could reduce operating costs, as the intent 
of this research was to maximize cost savings. 
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Within the HSC community, three squadrons were chosen for study based on their 
composition. All squadrons are a part of the HSC Wing Pacific (HSCWP), so they share 
maintenance facilities and operate under common directives. Additionally, each squadron 
has varying operational requirements and deployment models, creating a diversity that is 
not seen within other helicopter wings. The three squadrons chosen were HSC-3, HSC-8 
and HSC-21. All three squadrons are reporting custodians for aircraft and conduct 
maintenance at the operational level, so they each fall within the boundaries of this 
investigation. 
HSC-3 is the Pacific FRS and provides training to fleet replacement pilots and 
aircrew prior to their arrival in deploying squadrons.  HSC-3 is the largest helicopter 
squadron in the U.S. Navy and currently flies the MH-60S, HH-60H, and SH-60F.  HSC-
8 is a CVW squadron that has deployed as part of the CVW-9 on-board CVN74.  HSC 
CVW squadrons deploy as an entire unit and serve the rotary wing needs of the CSG.  
HSC-21 is an expeditionary squadron that deploys as smaller detachments as part of an 
ESG or with USNS assets.  The manning requirements of each squadron are different, as 
are the number of aircraft that is assigned to each squadron.  For the time period of this 
study, HSC-3 had conducted at least one phase inspection on 18 different aircraft, with 10 
aircraft for HSC-21 and 8 for HSC-8.  Each squadron has aircraft equipped with IMDS to 
facilitate Functional Check Flights (FCF) and others that use the older Automated Track 
and Balance Set (ATABS) system.  ATABS, which is not discussed in great detail in this 
paper, performs many of the same maintenance functions as the IMDS, but is not 
integrated into the airframe.  The ATABS usage is governed by the A1-H60CA-VIB-100, 
which contains an extensive description of system operations for operators and 




B. MEASURES AND METRICS 
Having established the subject of the study, it is important to outline the metrics 
that will be used. There is a series of metrics and measures of performance that are 
relevant to the study. For MH-60S maintenance, there are four measures of performance 
(MOP): maintenance labor hours, flight hours, time usage, and flight safety. The 
foundation of these four elements is derived from the discussion of NAMP organization 
and performance improvement in Chapter II. These four MOPs were used to create a 
series of eight metrics that allow for the comparison of the baseline and alternative cases 
that are discussed in Chapter V.  The metrics and their associated measures are found in 
Table 7. 
Table 7.   Measures and Metrics 
Metrics Associated MOP 
Operational Availability (AO) System Availability 
Percentage of Aircraft Incidents caused by 
Mechanical Failure 
Flight Safety 
Percentage of Mechanical Incidents 
monitored by IMDS 
Flight Safety 
Percentage of Mechanical Incidents caused 
by Human Error 
Flight Safety 
FCF Hours per Flight Hour Flight Hours Usage 
FCF Hours per Phase Inspection Flight Hours Usage 
Scheduled Maintenance Hours Percentage Maintenance Labor Hours 
Unscheduled Maintenance Hour 
Percentage 
Maintenance Labor Hours 
Difference of Expected and Actual Labor 
Hours Used per Phase 
Maintenance Labor Hours 
Average Phase Labor Hours Maintenance Labor Hours 
 
1. Measure of Effectiveness and Performance 
The four measures listed in the previous section can be separated into measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP).  The definition of 
effectiveness shall be that used by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), meaning “the ability 
of a system to the job for which it was intended.”  For this study, the measures of 
effectiveness are the ability of maintenance process to meet the NAMP goals discussed in 
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Chapter II, along with the NAE goals from Chapter III.  For the sake of brevity, these are 
summarized as the ability to provide greater capability to achieve less cost. 
The MOPs are related to and derived from these MOEs as a way to measure the 
performance of the maintenance system.  The definition of MOP used for this study 
comes from the DAU Glossary (2011) as “distinctly quantifiable performance features”, 
in this case, hours flown, labor hours, availability, and flight safety. Each of these MOPs 
is discussed in length in the following sections. 
a. Maintenance Labor Hours 
Maintenance Labor Hours is an MOP that measures the amount of effort required 
to accomplish maintenance tasks. The total number of hours to accomplish the tasks 
related to a phase inspection and associated special inspections serves as the 
measurement for the amount of resources used for a phase. Labor hours do not include all 
of the costs associated with a phase, as parts usage also incurs a cost. The usage of parts, 
however, is outside the scope of this study due to the difficulty in cataloguing all of the 
parts used to replace defects found during a phase inspection. Therefore, maintenance 
costs will be measured in terms of labor hours and flight hours. 
Maintenance labor hours are recorded for every maintenance task and coded 
based on the type of maintenance being conducted. These codes are part of the 
NALCOMIS/OOMA system which is used to keep a complete record of all aircraft by 
BUNO, which is equivalent to the aircraft serial number. More discussion of maintenance 
job codes and the methodology used to determine the relevant maintenance for this study 
is found in Chapter V. The purpose of the maintenance labor hours MOP is to quantify 
the total number of labor hours to accomplish each phase and maximize the number of 
flight hours achieved per maintenance labor hour. 
b. Flight Hours 
Flight hours are a desired outcome of any aircraft maintenance effort, as the 
purpose of maintenance is to attain and maintain aircraft in a flyable status. Flights that 
are related to maintenance activities are called Functional Check Flights (FCF), and these 
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flights are used to accomplish the post-phase vibration analysis required by the MCR-
400. A review of the VIB-100 and VIB-200 reveals that certain maintenance activities 
during a phase inspection lead to required flight checks that are accomplished as part of 
an FCF. Since an aircraft is cannot be certified “safe for flight” under the NAMP until the 
FCF is completed, FCF flight hours do not provide operational capability (4790.2B 
2013). Therefore, FCF flight hours are used as a measure of performance for maintenance 
actions. The goal of any maintenance effort should be to minimize the number of FCF 
flight hours, as this allows for more flight hours to be used for operational tasking. FCF 
hours account for about five percent of all flight hours flown within the sample 
population used in this study. Flight Hours and FCF usage results are discussed in 
Chapter V. 
c. Availability 
Availability is an important measure of the amount of time an aircraft is able to be 
used for operational tasking. For this study, which is focused on the effects of phase 
inspections, availability is a MOP determined by the time between phases and the number 
of days in phase. The availability MOP is directly related to the operational availability 
metric which measures it. The definition of operational availability (AO) for this study is 
derived from Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) as: 
    
        
 
In which MTBM equals Mean Time Between Maintenance and MDT equals 
Maintenance Down Time.   
MTBM is defined as the number of days any aircraft is available for operational 
tasking. Therefore, MTBM is the time from the completion of the post-phase FCF until 
the time an aircraft is inducted into phase. Further, the phase induction date is considered 
the day after the last flight prior to the beginning of the phase inspection, as is the HSC 
community practice. This phase induction day occurs at the completion of approximately 
175 flight hours, plus any additional hours used prior to phase induction in accordance 
with NAMPSOP directives. MDT is defined as the number of days from the day 
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following the last flight prior to phase induction until the completion of the post-phase 
FCF. During this period, any aircraft undergoing a phase inspection is not available for 
operational tasking, so it is considered unavailable. Operational Availability as a metric is 
the percentage of time that an aircraft is available for operational tasking between the 
induction of an aircraft into one phase (A, B, C or D) and the next subsequent phase. The 
goal of availability as a MOP is to increase time available between phase inspections and 
reduce the time spent in a phase inspection. 
d. Flight Safety 
Flight Safety is the final measure of performance, as maintenance processes are 
used to guarantee the functionality of aircraft systems to ensure safe operations. Flight 
safety is quantified in the number of aircraft safety incidents over a given period of time. 
For this study, aircraft safety incidents are measured as the number of hazard reports 
(HAZREP) that occurred the period from January 2009 until August 2014. This number 
of incidents does not include flight accidents (mishaps) that caused serious damage to 
aircraft or injury to personnel.  Navy mishap and HAZREP reports attained through the 
Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) are privileged for use by flight crews only, and no 
specifics of any incident can be released due to legal concerns. Since compiling data on 
mishaps would necessarily include a listing of costs or injury information, these reports 
were not included in this study to protect the confidentiality of those involved. 
HAZREP data, conversely, simply provides aircrews with information on possible 
hazards to aviation. Any information in these reports is provided voluntarily by aviation 
squadrons, so data can be used without compromising the privileged nature of the report. 
The measure of flight safety based on maintenance is the number of mechanically related 
flight hazards.  The performance goal of maintenance is to reduce the number of 
mechanical hazards and human-caused incidents that compromise flight safety. 
2. Metrics 
The metrics listed in Table 7 provide the quantitative measure for each MOP with 
which the metrics are associated. The maintenance labor hours MOP is maximized by a 
reduction in the number of labor hours to complete a phase inspection. Since the phase 
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includes a “look” and “fix” portion, all maintenance actions related to inspecting and 
correcting discrepancies are captured as scheduled labor hours. The metrics for the labor 
hours MOP are therefore the percentage of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, 
average phase labor hours and the ratio of planned to actual phase hours used. These 
metrics determine the relative breakdown of maintenance labor and the efficiency with 
which maintenance is conducted. These four metrics are further detailed in Chapter V. 
In terms of flight hour usage, the metrics are the ratio of FCF hours to total flight 
hours and FCF hours per phase inspection. These metrics articulate the amount of waste 
in terms of flight hours needed to achieve operational availability. Additionally, the FCF 
hours per phase metric determines the number of flight hours that are lost for operational 
tasking as a direct result of each phase inspection. Finally, the metrics associated with 
flight safety determine the frequency of mechanical problems not corrected by 
maintenance action. These metrics provide an understanding of the relative frequency of 
mechanical safety hazards, the effects of human error on flight safety, and the ability of 
IMDS to improve flight safety in comparison to non-IMDS capable aircraft. 
3. Value 
The use of EVM provides a great tool to assist in the gap analysis of the MH-60S, 
as it provides an easily traceable value for closing the CBM capability gap. By applying 
these metrics to the data collected, the relative cost of maintenance under alternative 
scenarios can be determined for each individual aircraft and phase type. Using the 
equations provided in Figures 2 and 3, the functional gains and losses due to the 
performance of maintenance can be captured.  
The greatest value is attained by maximizing performances while minimizing 
investments. The investment is the amount of maintenance labor hours used to achieve 
the functional performance of operational flight time. Therefore, the performance is 
quantified by the total number of operational flight hours achieved and total amount of 
availability of operational aircraft. Increasing flight safety, therefore, increases the worth 
of performance by minimizing losses due to human error and poor maintenance 
outcomes. Using the available metrics provides a way to quantify this value in terms of 
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costs and benefits achieved by closing the capability gaps related to CBM.  This value 
determination in turn allows decision makers the ability to weigh the cost of increasing 
CBM tools against the value that CBM capability provides. 
C. CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENT 
1. JCIDS CBA Guide 
The JCIDS Capabilities Based Assessment Guide serves as an excellent guide for 
determining capability gaps with a program. The CBA Guide outlines the steps that take 
place in a formal JCIDS CBA. Even though all of these steps are not conducted as a part 
of this study, the CBA Guide does provide the steps necessary to determine if capability 
gaps exist. The CBA Guide provides the following guidance for programs such as the 
MH-60S. 
When performing a CBA relative to an existing capability solution that 
may require replacement/recapitalization or evolution to meet future 
capability requirements, the CBA is starting from a known baseline and 
making excursions to address potential future capability requirements. In 
this case the CBA should take no more than 60-90 calendar days to 
demonstrate that the replacement/recapitalization/evolution is required. 
The alternatives for the solution will be further considered in the AoA or 
similar review (DOD 2012, A-B-3). 
The MH-60S maintenance system meets this definition very clearly, so the gap 
analysis uses this as a guide. Additionally, the gap analysis uses the following passage to 
define the necessary steps and as a concept of operations. 
A CBA begins by identifying the mission or military problem to be 
assessed, the concepts to be examined, the timeframe in which the 
problem is being assessed, and the scope of the assessment. A CBA 
determines the relevant concepts, CONOPS, and objectives, and lists the 
related effects to be achieved. A CBA may also lead to policy 
development or support and validation of existing policies 
There is no strict format for a CONOPS, but it should describe the 
following areas at a minimum:  
 (a) the problem being addressed  
 (b) the mission  
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 (c) the commander’s intent  
 (d) an operational overview  
 (e) the objectives to be achieved  
 (f) the roles and responsibilities of tasked organizations  
(DOD 2012, A-B-1). 
2. CBA Concept of Operations 
Using the CBA Guide as a basis, the CONOPS for the gap analysis includes the 
following actions: problem to be assessed, mission, timeline, scope, commander’s intent, 
operational overview, objectives to be achieved, roles and responsibilities of tasked 
organizations. These areas provide key functional performances, drivers of maintenance 
approach, rationale for maintenance, and an overall characterization of operational 
sensitivities. The following sections include the description of each of these areas, 
followed by descriptions of the data that was collected and analyzed. 
a. Problem 
Due to decreases in funding following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, how can 
the cost of operating legacy systems be reduced?  The problem is maintenance on the 
MH-60S limits the number of operations that can be flown. Limiting the number of 
flights decreases operational effectiveness and jeopardizes the mission. For the MH-60S, 
that problem is expressed in terms of a question: what tools exist to achieve cost savings 
and what impediments should be expected to implementing cost savings?   
b. Solution 
The use of condition-based maintenance has been identified by the Navy and 
DOD as a likely source of cost savings and a preferred maintenance method. CBM tools 
currently exist, such as IMD-HUMS, but have not been used to replace extant 
maintenance practices based on inspection cycles. Finally, does IMD-HUMS meet all of 
the needs to close the capability gap between a CBM-only maintenance process and the 
current maintenance structure? 
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c. Goal 
The primary goal of gap analysis is to determine the structures of value to aid 
decision-makers. The intent is to maximize value in the tradeoffs of investment versus 
functional performance. The problem statement serves to create the perspective from 
which to construct a means for evaluating alternatives solutions. For a system such as the 
MH-60S, maintenance requires evolution to meet future needs and changes to make the 
system relevant to changing missions, uses, and requirements. There must be a baseline 
for current performance that establishes the measurement of the gap, from which 
alternative solutions are compared.  
Therefore, the goal is to create a baseline for comparison, determine possible 
alternatives, and then to apply a means of comparing alternatives. Based on the scope and 
available data, the baseline of performance is the number of labor hours and flight hours 
used to support phase and special inspections in the MH-60S. Alternatives are limited to 
systems already in existence, so the only alternative is increased CBM using IMDS for 
the MH-60S. Finally, the means for comparing alternatives was carried out through the 
constructs of value and worth of capabilities within the set of analyzed solutions using the 
equations provided by Langford and Franck. 
d. Timeline 
The timeline for analysis is based on the available data from the MH-60S 
community. Due to community maintenance requirements, all labor usage and flight hour 
data is kept for a period of at least 12 months on local servers in each squadron. Flight 
data is kept in the Sierra/Hotel Advanced Readiness Program (SHARP) and maintenance 
data in the NALCOMIS Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity (OOMA).  
Therefore, the timeline selected was a 13-month period from July 2013 to August 2014 
when all flight data and maintenance labor usage is available for the squadrons being 
investigated. Outside this timeline, maintenance data is discarded as no longer relevant to 
current operations and the available data becomes more sporadic. 
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e. Scope 
Within the boundaries established in Chapter III, the scope of the research is 
narrowed to specific activities that can be measured and compared. All aircraft 
considered for this research are currently part of the HSC Wing Pacific, and were 
analyzed by BUNO based on the movement of aircraft within the wing due to operational 
requirements. Additionally, all maintenance actions considered were performed by the 
reporting custodian for these aircraft, i.e., squadron personnel within the HSCWP.  
As part of the NAMP discussed in Chapter III, the scope of maintenance actions 
is confined to those related to phase and special inspections. The most common 
comparisons to be made are the number of labor hours used for scheduled and corrective 
maintenance, with and without CBM. The comparison of these across the entire timeline 
discussed in the previous section creates an understanding of the amount of effort 
directed to both scheduled and corrective maintenance actions. Within this framework, 
the scope is further narrowed to focus on the actions and hours required to complete 
phase inspections. Since phase inspections require such extensive maintenance, the result 
is the use of both maintenance labor hours and flight hours to return the aircraft to 
operational status (NAVAIR 2010). Since Vibration Analysis is required at the 
completion of each phase due to the nature of maintenance performed, a functional check 
flight is required after each phase. Therefore, the cost of a phase is related not just to the 
labor hours used for maintenance but the flight hours for FCF to return the aircraft to 
mission capable status.  
The scope also extends to the special inspections which often occur in conjunction 
with phase inspections. All told, the scope of comparisons includes the number of labor 
hours used for corrective and scheduled maintenance, labor hours used for each phase, 
flight hours used after each phase for FCF, and the effects on operational availability due 
to aircraft time in phase. Additionally, using the IMDS ground station, exceedances of 
flight parameters are noted which necessitate inspections on aircraft components 
accomplished during phase. Through the use of this IMDS data, it is readily determined 
whether phase inspections would be warranted based on the performance of the aircraft. 
More specifically, if the aircraft had no parameter exceedances above non-operable light 
 67 
limits, there would be no reason to perform a maintenance phase due to aircraft condition. 
The combination of these factors bests measures the NAMP requirements for 
“performance improvement” presented in Chapter II.  
The final scope parameter is related to safety of flight. Since the phase inspection 
cycle inspects all major aircraft systems, there is a genuine concern that CBM could 
reduce safety. Through statistics compiled from the Web Enabled Safety System 
(WESS), it is possible to determine the likely cause of mechanical defects which result in 
mishap or hazard reports. Since the information in these reports in privileged to the H-60 
community, it is impossible to release details of any aviation incident. Therefore, through 
an anonymous investigation of causes, it is possible to determine if IMDS was installed 
on incident aircraft. Then comparisons can be made to non-IMDS capable aircraft. 
f. Commander’s Intent 
The commander’s intent is established through the directives governing 
condition-based maintenance discussed in Chapter III. The common theme in each of 
these directives is that CBM is the desired end state for all DOD programs. This theme is 
reiterated in both the CNO CBM directive and the Naval Vision 2020. It is unambiguous 
that the desired capability is a transition to exclusively condition-based maintenance for 
all legacy systems. Since the MH-60S was designed with the IMD-HUMS as a CBM 
facilitator, the commander’s intent is to transition to processes that maximize CBM. 
g. Operational Overview 
Building on the discussion of scope, the operational overview involves the 
procedures executed as part of this study. The first step was the selection of operational 
squadrons for data collection with the boundaries of the study. To obtain an accurate 
cross section of the HSCWP, one of each type (FRS, Expeditionary, CVW) of squadron 
was chosen for data analysis. As discussed in Chapter III on IMD-HUMS, these 
squadrons had various IMDS capabilities for their aircraft.  
After choosing HSC-3, HSC-8, and HSC-21, a baseline was created for phase 
requirements in terms of labor and flight hour usage. This work was done using the 
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OOMA system to catalogue the type of phases conducted during the timeframe and the 
number of labor hours recorded as a part of each phase. Since OOMA codes individual 
work by labor hours and the type of work performed, labor hours can be easily 
determined for each aircraft during the phase period. To determine phase dates, the 
aircraft is considered to be inducted into the phase after the completion of the last flight 
prior to the phase inspection date. Since phases are based on flight hours, this 
determination is a common practice within the community and provides a consistent 
estimate for the beginning of a phase.  
To obtain phase labor hours, an OOMA records query was conducted for all job 
codes related to the look and fix portions of each phase (NAVAIR 2013). As noted in the 
MRC-400, all phases include a “look” portion to inspect aircraft parts and a “fix” portion 
to repair these parts as necessary. The labor hours collected involve all scheduled 
maintenance jobs coded for the phase occurring between the phase induction date and 
completion date. The phase completion date is kept in the OOMA inspection records, 
along with all special inspection dates.   
Once the data was collected for all aircraft in the squadron’s inventory, the IMDS 
ground station was analyzed. Using the ground station, all IMDS equipped aircraft were 
checked for exceedances related to monitored systems. Any consistent exceedance 
beyond the non-operable flight limit was considered a facilitator of phase maintenance. 
That is to say, if no exceedance was discovered beyond a non-operable flight limit, the 
phase is considered not warranted for the purposes of this study. 
In terms of flight hours, the total number of flight hours for each aircraft was 
collected for each BUNO in the squadron’s inventory. Additionally, the FCF hours 
related to each phase were collected. These hours were determined using the SHARP 
records for each BUNO and related to the date of the FCF. Since community practice 
requires a FCF to be completed prior to operational tasking, the first flights after each 
phase completion are FCFs. The VIB-100 and VIB-200 require that post-phase FCF be 
performed based on the maintenance that is performed during the phase inspection. FCF 
flight hours performed in conjunction with phase inspections include all flight hours from 
the phase completion date until the first non-FCF flight. This method of tabulating FCF 
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hours related to phase maintenance is accurate since the FCF completion allows the 
aircraft to again execute operational tasking, per community NATOPS directives. 
SHARP flight records are coded by flight mission type, so FCFs related to phase are 
easily distinguished in the flight record and the FCF flight hours accurately collected. 
To measure the effects on operational availability, the flight record was used to 
determine the number of calendar days that an aircraft is unavailable for tasking due to 
phase maintenance. This calculation was completed for each BUNO starting from the day 
following of the last flight prior to the phase completion date until the date of the FCF 
completion following the phase. Since this number is reported in days, the aircraft is 
considered operationally available the day of the last flight prior to phase and after the 
exact time of the FCF completion. This measure provides an accurate measure for the 
number of days of operational availability lost directly as a result of phase inspections.   
Once all of this data was collected, a series of comparisons was made between the 
different aircraft populations. Additionally, the value and worth equations from Chapter 
III were applied to the results to determine the value of closing any capability gaps. These 
comparisons are discussed, along with the results and conclusions, in Chapters V and VI. 
The final operations performed involved the analysis of safety reporting data. This 
data was collected from the Naval Safety Center WESS system and involved all MH-60S 
aircraft incident (HAZREP) reports from 2009-2014. Since these reports are privileged 
(due to the legal implications of aircraft incident information), no specifics from any 
report are released as part of this analysis.  Using the reports, anonymous statistics were 
created for each aircraft incident, based on whether there was a mechanical cause. If a 
mechanical cause existed, the aircraft was categorized as IMDS capable or non-IMDS 
capable. This comparison allows for the determination of any persistent capability gaps in 
IMDS aircraft that will require further engineering. The results of the flight safety review 
and comparisons between IMDS and non-IMDS capable aircraft safety records are 
reported in Chapter V. 
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h. Objectives 
The objectives of the gap analysis are outlined within the CBA Guide. For the 
MH-60S, one objective is to create an accurate baseline for usage of labor hours and 
flight hours as a result of conducting a phase. Another objective is to determine the value 
created by IMDS capability, both under current usage and with the desired CBM 
capability. For aircraft equipped with IMDS, the objective is to determine if routine 
operations necessitate phase maintenance as a result of exceeding operational limits. The 
final objective is related to the ability of IMDS to monitor aircraft safety. Through the use 
of aircraft incident data, any remaining capability gaps related to the monitoring 
capability of IMDS are determined and recommended for further engineering. Together, 
these objectives combine to provide the value of closing the CBM capability gap and 
identify any residual capability gaps that exist. 
i. Roles and Responsibilities 
The roles and responsibilities are in many ways external to this study, but relate to 
the use of its results. Since this study is not a JCIDS product, the roles and 
responsibilities are filled nearly exclusively by the author. On the other hand, the results 
could lead to a more formal JCIDS capabilities investigation, which would greatly benefit 
the HSCWP. The HSCWP serves as the entity responsible for meeting operational 
tasking using the MH-60S.  
As the administrative commander for HSC CVW squadrons and the operational 
commander for FRS and Expeditionary squadrons, the HSCWP has the responsibility to 
maximize use of the results of this study. Since the HCSWP has a non-deployable FRS 
squadron, HSC-3, which is part of this study, many of the recommendations can be 
applied in a more controlled environment. The conclusions and extensions of this study 




Having discussed the parameters of this study in Chapters I-IV, the results are 
presented and analyzed. This chapter begins with a description the data collection 
methods that were used. From this data, a baseline of phase maintenance was created for 
comparison and detailed in this chapter. Next, an alternative for the current phase 
maintenance processes is proposed and compared to the baseline case. Finally, a 
discussion of value concludes this chapter, including a consideration of the capability 
gaps that are closed by the alternative phase process and remaining gaps in CBM 
capability not addressed by IMDS. 
A. DATA COLLECTION METHODS  
Data collection was done using the available maintenance data from HSC-3, 
HSC-8 and HSC-21 for the period from 1 July 2013 until 1 August 2014. These 
squadrons were described in detail in Chapter IV, and each squadron operates under 
common maintenance practices within the HSCWP. The major sources of data included 
both the NALCOMIS/OOMA system, used to report maintenance actions, and the IMDS 
ground station, which collects IMDS rotor and vibration data. The IMDS ground station 
includes the mechanical diagnostics tools (MDAT), which provides mechanical data for 
accelerometer locations throughout the aircraft described in Table 5. Additionally, the use 
of the Naval Safety Center WESS program is described as the source of flight safety data. 
The information in this section is a supplement to the Concept of Operations section 
found in Chapter IV and provides a greater level of detail for the data collection methods 
from each data source. 
1. NALCOMIS/OOMA 
NALCOMIS/OOMA is the software database that is used to catalogue all 
maintenance jobs within HSC squadrons. NALCOMIS/OOMA was discussed in Chapter 
II of this study and the program is outlined in Chapter 13 of the NAMP (2013). Since all 
of the squadrons involved in this study are operational level maintenance activities, the 
Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity (OOMA) was the interface used to 
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access maintenance information. OOMA maintains all maintenance, logistics, and flight 
records for aircraft that are currently in an individual squadron’s inventory 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013). For the purpose of compiling historical maintenance 
work, all maintenance labor actions, i.e., jobs completed, are required to be stored in 
OOMA for at least 12 months (COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013). Additionally, this 
historical data may be available up to five years and catalogued by BUNO 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013). The use of BUNOs means that when an aircraft is 
transferred to another squadron, the accepting squadron will have a complete record of 
aircraft maintenance and logistics information for at least 12 months. 
The availability of OOMA data for each squadron in the aircraft sample allows 
for the collection of maintenance usage data. The data collected from OOMA for this 
study was focused on maintenance labor hours by BUNO for aircraft within HSC-3, 
HSC-8 and HSC-21. Not all aircraft in these squadrons were part of the study. Since the 
focus is the effects of phase maintenance, only aircraft that had undergone a phase within 
the period from July 2013 to August 2014 were considered. For example, HSC-3 had 
several aircraft which were in O-level preservation and did not fly enough during the 
study period to warrant a phase inspection. These aircraft, therefore, were excluded from 
the sample.   
Additionally, aircraft that were on a detachment away from the home station 
during the time data was compiled were also excluded. Since these aircraft are not 
located with the “home guard” portion of the squadron, the data is not available through 
local OOMA database. The combination of this fact along with the fact that most OOMA 
data is only available for 12-15 months made collection of data for these aircraft during 
the study period unreliable. Therefore, the data from these deployed aircraft was also 
excluded.  
Using the OOMA records from each squadron, the dates of phases within the 
study time period were catalogued. The phase window was considered the time from the 
end of the last flight prior to phase induction until the date of the phase completion. Since 
OOMA catalogues all maintenance labor hours by type maintenance (TM) code, actions 
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are logged by the applicable code during both the “look” and “fix” phases 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013).  
“Look” and “fix” mean that any inspection carried out and the actions to correct 
discrepancies found during said inspection are included as scheduled maintenance under 
the applicable code. The codes that were considered applicable to each phase were coded 
as: “Phase Inspection”, “Special Engine Inspection”, “Hourly Special Aircraft 
Inspections”, “Cycle or Event Special Aircraft Inspection”, and “Daily, Turnaround, 
Special Inspections and Preservation or Depreservation Actions” 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 2013). Using the ad hoc query feature in OOMA for the 
specified TM codes and phase dates, maintenance labor hours were collected for each 
phase inspection on each aircraft in the study sample. One caveat to note is the inclusion 
of special inspections does increase the number of inspection actions if conducted in 
conjunction with a phase. To include this in the total for each BUNO, all 364, 546 and 
728 day inspections that occurred during the phase window were taken into account as 
part of the expected labor hour calculations. Expected and actual labor hours are covered 
in more detail later in this chapter. 
In addition to phase labor hours, OOMA was also used to compile total 
maintenance labor hours, along with scheduled and unscheduled labor hours. To acquire 
the data for the “scheduled maintenance percentage” metric, the total number of labor 
hours and the number of unscheduled labor hours were collected for each aircraft. These 
labor hours were collected for the entire time period and provide an understanding of the 
complete workload for each individual aircraft. All labor hours were compiled by BUNO 
and used to populate metrics and for statistical analysis purposes discussed later in this 
chapter. 
2. Sierra/Hotel Advanced Readiness Program 
The Sierra/Hotel Advanced Readiness Program (SHARP) was used to collect all 
flight hour data for each of the aircraft in the study. OOMA also maintains flight data 
records, but HSC community standards specify that flights are logged in SHARP and the 
data is then transferred to OOMA electronically. This transfer ensures that all flight data 
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used for operations and maintenance purposes is identical. SHARP was chosen for flight 
record information due to the ease of use over the OOMA flight record data. 
SHARP data was used to calculate flight hours, FCF hours, and availability 
measures of each BUNO. SHARP is maintained as a local depository of flight hour data 
in each squadron, and flight hour records are maintained by BUNO for all flights for an 
in-determinate period. For this reason, all squadrons in the study had data on flight hour 
available for at least two years, providing more complete records. On the other hand, only 
flights that took place when the specific BUNO was in the squadron’s inventory are 
maintained in the log, which is not transferred along with the aircraft. For this reason, the 
flight hour histories of each BUNO were tracked through multiple SHARP databases to 
form a complete record. 
Using the SHARP records, a complete flight history for each BUNO was 
constructed from the end of the phase inspection previous to the timeline of this study 
through 1 August 2014. This date range allowed for the calculation of MTBM and MDT 
for availability purposes, along with the collection of FCF flight hour and total flight hour 
data. This information was used to calculate the “Operational Availability”, “FCF Hours 
Per Flight Hours” and “FCF Hours Per Phase Inspection” metrics from Table 7. 
3. IMDS Ground Station 
IMDS ground station data was used to determine trends in component 
performance that would warrant further inspection. IMDS ground station includes both 
the ground station (GS) and MDAT databases. The GS was used to collect data on rotor 
track and balance performance between phases, and MDAT used to collect mechanical 
diagnostic data on various parts of the aircraft. All IMDS data was collected by BUNO 
for each IMDS capable aircraft in the sample. Since the purpose of IMDS data is to 
support the diagnosis of failures before they take place, the relevant time period for each 
BUNO is limited. Data was collected from the time of post-phase FCF completion until 
the last flight prior to phase induction for each BUNO. This period represents the time 
when an aircraft is certified safe-for-flight and trends in performance would warrant 
further maintenance. Since the current phase process includes the removal and 
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replacement of IMDS monitored components during a phase inspection, data collected 
during FCF is used to correct performance shortfalls. Therefore, data from these flights is 
expected to exceed limits and is not indicative of long-term performance. For this reason, 
data from post-phase FCF flights was excluded to ensure only operational performance 
trends were captured as part of each aircraft sample. 
This study used the available data for each aircraft during these inter-phase periods at 
various locations to determine the necessity of certain phase inspections. An aircraft was 
determined to require additional phase inspections if the IMDS non-operable flight limit 
was exceeded on multiple consecutive flights. Data collected from the IMDS GS and 
MDAT was then used to create the alternative phase maintenance case. The data 
collected was related to trends in component performance and included 1/revolution 
vibrations for the main rotor, port and starboard engine input modules, tail disconnect 
coupling, and tail rotor drive shaft. This sampling includes the major components 
monitored by IMDS as shown in Table 8. The results from the GS and MDAT data and 
their implications are discussed later in this chapter. 
Table 8.   IMDS Samples. 
Components System Monitored 
Main Rotor Main Rotor Track and Balance 
Port/Starboard ENG Input Module Engine Output Shaft Performance 
Disconnect Coupling #1-#5 Tail Drive Shaft Vibrations 
Tail Rotor Output Tail Rotor Vibrations 
 
4. Naval Safety Center Web Enabled Safety System 
The Naval Safety Center Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) was used to collect 
data related to flight safety. As was discussed in Chapter IV, this data is privileged, only 
available to aircrews, and used to improve safety in flight operations. The WESS system 
was used to collect all HAZREP data for MH-60S aircraft by squadron from January 
2009 until August 2014. The specifics of each incident cannot be published, but 
anonymous statistics were collected to create the “Percentage of Aircraft Incidents caused 
by Mechanical Failure,” “Percentage of Mechanical Incidents monitored by IMDS,” 
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“Percentage of Mechanical Incidents caused by Human Error.” Combined, these metrics 
reveal the number of safety issues related to mechanical problems and the amount that 
these are driven by human errors. This data helps provide context to the safety of 
eliminating certain phase inspections. Flight Safety will be discussed as part of the 
alternative phase inspection later in this chapter. 
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B. DATA ANALYSIS BASELINE 
Using the techniques outlined in the CBA from Chapter IV and the data collection 
methods from this chapter, a baseline for MH-60S maintenance performance was created. 
This baseline used the measures of performance and metrics outlined in Chapter IV to 
describe the current state of the MH-60S maintenance program. Since some aircraft 
possess IMDS capability and other do not; the baseline assessment must also include 
analysis of the current value of IMDS. That is to say, does IMDS capability provide any 
value by itself with implementing CBM? The first task is to determine the current effects 
of IMDS on the NAMP maintenance process, followed by a construction of a baseline 
using these effects. The results show that IMDS capability has a minimal positive effect 
on the current maintenance program. Therefore, a single baseline case was developed for 
all MH-60S aircraft, regardless of installed IMDS capability. 
1. IMDS and Non-IMDS Capability 
Since the purpose of this study is to determine the value of implementing a CBM 
capability into the MH-60S maintenance process, the extant value of CBM tools provides 
insight that enlightens the utility of CBM capabilities. The aircraft considered for this 
study includes a sample of 29 aircraft and 73 total phases. These phases are broken into 
A, B, C, and D by squadron with the data found in Table 9.  
Table 9.   Phases by Squadron. 
Phase Type HSC-3 HSC-8 HSC-21 Total by 
Phase  
A 13 5 3 21 
B 8 6 3 17 
C 9 4 3 16 
D 11 5 4 20 
Total By 
Squadron 
41 20 13 73 
From this sample, there were 12 IMDS capable aircraft and 17 non-IMDS capable 
aircraft. It is impossible to compare IMDS capability’s effect on phases within any 
squadron other than HSC-3. This conundrum arises because HSC-8 completed only four 
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phases on two aircraft that were non-IMDS capable and HSC-21 had no IMDS capable 
aircraft in its sample. For this reason, the effects of IMDS capability will only consider 
the entire sample population.  This situation is less than ideal, due to differences in 
squadron efficiency and labor hour reporting that are evident in comparisons of phase 
types. Consequently, the lack of IMDS and non-IMDS aircraft within any given squadron 
would lead to an introduction of bias due to small sample size if these comparisons were 
made. 
 To determine if IMDS capability had any positive value, it is necessary to 
compare the results of IMDS and non-IMDs aircraft in terms of operational availability, 
post-phase FCF hours and phase labor hours.  Since two samples were compared, a t-test 
assuming equal variances was used with an alpha of 0.05. In all cases, the null hypothesis 
shall be considered that IMDS capability leads to no difference in mean metric value. The 
alternative hypothesis is that IMDS capability produces a difference in the mean value of 
each metric. This relationship is presented in Figure 7. 
Figure 7.  IMDS Capability Hypothesis Test 
H0: µIMDS = µNON-IMDS 
H1: µIMDS ≠ µNON-IMDS 
α = 0.05 
a. Maintenance Labor Hours 
The first case to be compared is the difference between maintenance labor hour 
usage with IMDS capability installed or not-installed. Many special inspections are 
included as part of the phase and these actions are not distinguishable from the labor hour 
calculations due to the TM codes that are used. Therefore, the most relevant comparison 
of IMDS efficacy is the mean difference between expected hours for phase completion 
and actual hours for phase completion. To find this difference, the sum of phase hours to 
perform the phase inspection in the MRC-400 and any specials (364, 546, 728 days from 
the MRC-350) conducted during the phase window is used as the expected value of phase 
inspection hours. The difference between this value and the actual labor hours recorded 
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for each phase is then subjected to the hypothesis test described in Figure 7. The results 
of these hypothesis tests are found in Table 10. 
Table 10.   IMDS Effect on Phase Labor Hours 
Phase A 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 164.4 186.3 
Variance 153864.88 19531.04 
Observations   
P-value (two tail) 0.859 
Phase B 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 64.4 202.6 
Variance 10426.64 24271.83 
Observations 8 9 
P-value (two tail) 0.049989 
Phase C 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 148.41 48.63 
Variance 19470.96 19697.7 
Observations 5 11 
P-value (two tail) 0.2079 
Phase D 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 437.24 464.28 
Variance 143300.7 134914.9 
Observations 8 12 
P-value (two tail) 0.875 
Phase ALL PHASES 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 207.83 231.0 
Variance 103626.2 73026.0 
Observations 30 44 
P-value (two tail) 0.738 
 
As can be seen in Table 10, there is only one case in which the null hypothesis 
should be rejected. The “B” Phase shows a statistically significant difference in 
maintenance labor hour usage between IMDS and non-IMDS aircraft. The results also 
reveal that the mean of the “C” phase is about 100 labor hours less for non-IMDS 
aircraft, but this value is not quite significant at the 95 percent confidence level. An 
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analysis of all data revealed that IMDS does not provide a significant improvement in 
actual labor hours used in comparison to expected labor hours used at the 95 percent 
confidence level. 
b. Flight Hours 
Since the period between MH-60S phase inspections is limited to 175 flight hours 
by the MRC-400, then value could be achieved by reducing the number of FCF flight 
hours associated with a phase. Since FCF flight hours are not available for operational 
tasking, IMDS capability would provide a benefit by reducing the number of post-phase 
FCF flight hours. Each phase includes different system inspections and repairs, so the 
comparison of FCF flight hours must be divided by phase type. IMDS capability provides 
value if “FCF Hours per Phase Inspection” is less than non-IMDS aircraft at the 95 
confidence level. The results of the FCF flight hour comparisons are found in Table 11. 
As is evident from Table 11, there is a statistically significant difference between 
IMDS and non-IMDS capable aircraft in terms of FCF hours per phase inspection. For 
the “B” phase there is a statistically significant difference at the 95 percent confidence 
level between IMDS and non-IMDS capable aircraft. For the “A” phase, there is a 
significant difference at the 90 percent confidence interval to reject the null hypothesis, 
but not the 95 percent confidence level. This fact, combined with the p-value for the “D” 
phase below 0.25, suggests that FCF efficiency is improved by IMDS. Even though all 
measures do not meet the 95 percent confidence level, there is still strong evidence to 
suggest that at least some difference in mean metric values exists. If totaled, the mean 
expected FCF hours per phase cycle would be 18.3 flight hours for IMDS versus 26.5 
hours for non-IMDS capable aircraft. This number is not statistically significant for each 
phase, but it suggests a non-trivial difference, saving about 1.1 percent of total flight 
hours per 700 hour phase cycle. 
  
 81 
Table 11.   FCF Flight Hours t-Test 
Phase A 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 3.47 5.88 
Variance 1.295 14.91 
Observations 9 11 
P-value (two tail) 0.0878 
Phase B 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 3.24 7.38 
Variance 2.396 9.296 
Observations 8 8 
P-value (two tail) 0.00413 
Phase C 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 6.14 6.05 
Variance 3.173 8.464 
Observations 5 11 
P-value (two tail) 0.947 
Phase D 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 5.46 7.18 
Variance 6.26 10.012 
Observations 8 12 
P-value (two tail) 0.214 
 
c. Availability 
Availability is measured in terms of the number of days that an aircraft is 
available or unavailable or operational tasking. In terms of IMDS capability, this measure 
can be assessed by analyzing the entire sample populations of IMDS and non-IMDS 
aircraft. The metric “Operational Availability” is used to assess the MOP related to 
availability. Since operational availability is determined by the time between phases and 
the amount of time an aircraft is in phase, the type of phase is not important to this 
measure. The lack of distinction by phase is due to the fact that expected labor hours, i.e., 
those found in the MRC-400 for each phase, have minimal differences. Additionally, the 
number of days between phases is not impacted by the type of phase that preceded this 
time period. Therefore, IMDS and non-IMDS operational availability are assessed 
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regardless of the phase type. Table 12 contains the results of the operational availability 
comparison between IMDS and non-IMDS aircraft.  
Table 12.   Operational Availability (IMDS v. non-IMDS). 
 Operational Availability 
 IMDS Non-IMDS 
Mean 0.725 0.659 
Variance 0.0315 0.0278 
Observations 29 39 
P-value (two tail) 0.119 
 
The results reveal that there is not a statistically significant difference in means at the 95 
percent confidence level. The p-value of 0.119 does reveal that the difference in means is 
not trivial. The p-value does not, however, meet the criteria to reject the null hypothesis, 
so it must be accepted that the mean operational availability is the same between IMDS 
and non-IMDS aircraft. 
2. Maintenance Performance Baseline 
The results of the comparison of IMDS and non-IMDS aircraft reveal that there is 
a non-trivial difference between their performances. On the other hand, there is not a 
statistically significant difference in performance at the 95 percent confidence level for 
most metrics based on availability, flight hours or labor hours. For this reason, the 
baseline of current performance does not differentiate between IMDS and non-IMDS 
capable aircraft. The baseline case was created to satisfy the JCIDS CBA discussed in 
Chapter IV. The baseline forms the heart of the capability gap analysis and was used to 
measure the value of a CBM alternative. 
The baseline case was calculated using the average value of the MOPs and 
associated metrics from Chapter IV. Three of the four MOPs, maintenance labor hours, 
availability, and flight hours are included in the baseline case. Flight safety was not used 
as a part of the baseline. This omission is due to the small sample size of mechanical 
incidents in the safety data and is discussed in a separate section in this chapter. Baseline 
cases were formed for both the entire aircraft sample population and the samples of 
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individual squadrons. These sampling decisions were due to the differing composition of 
the aircraft variants in each squadron and the different efficiency achieved by the 
associated maintenance departments. Tables 13-17 contain the performance baseline in 
terms of maintenance labor usage, flight hour usage, and availability under the current 
NAMP process. 














HSC-3 A AVG 419.2 243.9 175.3 73.17 
HSC-3 B AVG 362.5 208.4 154.1 74.40 
HSC-3 C AVG 402.9 246.1 156.8 62.02 
HSC-3 D AVG 911.1 330.8 580.3 171.36 
HSC-3 AVG Phase 536.6 260.8 275.8 105.75 
HSC-3 Total Cycle 2095.8 1029.2 1066.5 103.63 
HSC-8 A AVG 471.4 251.9 219.5 48.27 
HSC-8 B AVG 296.9 223.7 73.2 24.10 
HSC-8 C AVG 186.7 239.5 -52.8 -16.10 
HSC-8 D AVG 554.8 355.3 199.5 64.93 
HSC-8 AVG Phase 382.4 267.8 114.6 33.05 
HSC-8 Total Cycle 1509.8 1070.3 439.5 41.06 
HSC-21 A AVG 438.0 233.8 204.2 87.35 
HSC-21 B AVG 465.2 212.0 253.2 121.83 
HSC-21 C AVG 230.0 233.8 -3.8 -1.64 
HSC-21 D AVG 709.1 319.2 389.9 122.13 
HSC-21 AVG Phase 479.7 255.0 224.6 88.08 
HSC-21 Total Cycle 1842.2 998.8 843.5 84.45 
A AVG 420.4 243.5 176.9 69.27 
B AVG 352.2 214.6 137.6 65.02 
C AVG 323.3 245.2 78.1 30.56 
D AVG 786.3 332.8 453.5 134.91 
All AVG Phase 482.6 261.4 221.3 77.66 














HSC-3 Total 76559.7 38172.9 114732.6   
HSC-3 Average 5104.0 2544.9 7648.8 66.73% 
HSC-8 Total 28821.1 17443.8 46264.9   
HSC-8 Average 3202.3 1938.2 5140.5 62.30% 
HSC-21 Total 22284.7 15269.6 37554.3   
HSC-21 
Average 4456.94 3053.92 7510.86 59.34% 
All Total  363403.4 191640.0 555043.5   
All Average 4402.3 2444.4 6846.6 64.30% 
 








HSC-3 Total 374.4 7231.1   
HSC-3 Average 25.0 482.1 5.18% 
HSC-8 Total 117.7 2584.4   
HSC-8 Average 13.1 287.2 4.55% 
HSC-21 Total 130.8 1960.2   
HSC-21 Average 26.16 392.04 6.67% 
All Total  1780.1 33751.8   









Flight Hours Lost 
HSC-3 A AVG 4.8 2.75 
HSC-3 B AVG 6.9 3.92 
HSC-3 C AVG 6.1 3.46 
HSC-3 D AVG 6.2 3.52 
HSC-3 AVG Phase 5.9 3.31 
HSC-3 Total Cycle 23.9 3.41 
HSC-8 A AVG 2.8 1.57 
HSC-8 B AVG 3.5 2.02 
HSC-8 C AVG 7.5 4.27 
HSC-8 D AVG 7.8 4.44 
HSC-8 AVG Phase 4.9 2.78 
HSC-8 Total Cycle 21.5 3.08 
HSC-21 A AVG 7.8 4.46 
HSC-21 B AVG 5.4 3.09 
HSC-21 C AVG 4.0 2.30 
HSC-21 D AVG 7.1 4.07 
HSC-21 AVG 
Phase 6.2 3.56 
HSC-21 Total 
Cycle 24.4 3.48 
A AVG 4.8 2.74 
B AVG 5.3 3.03 
C AVG 6.1 3.47 
D AVG 6.5 3.71 
All AVG Phase 5.7 3.24 










HSC-3 63 42 0.602 
HSC-8 123 48 0.721 
HSC-21 84 24 0.775 
All Squadrons 89 40 0.690 
 
The collection of information in Tables 13-17 provides the baseline case for each 
individual squadron and the entire sample population in terms of the relevant MOPs. This 
data presents the current state of phase maintenance as applied to the HSC community 
operating the MH-60S. From this data, all of the metrics from Table 7 are applied to the 
data collected from each squadron. Additionally, an average of inter-squadron 
performance is presented. This information was used as the basis for comparison with the 
alternative phase construction presented later in this chapter. 
From this data, one observes that each squadron achieves different levels of 
efficiency in terms of labor hours, flight hours and availability. In terms of labor hours, 
the squadrons using more non-IMDS aircraft tend to require more labor. An analysis of 
the relevant BUNOs reveals that aircraft in HSC-21 and HSC-3 are generally older 
(lower BUNO), which is the likely cause of the higher labor hour totals. HSC-8, which 
has mostly IMDS aircraft, has a lower average FCF hour total than the other squadrons, 
which is expected given the comparisons of IMDS and non-IMDS aircraft made in the 
previous section. Finally, HSC-3 has the lowest operational availability, but this seems to 
be a result of shorter MTBM than other squadrons. HSC-21 achieves the best Ao, mostly 
due to the fact that MDT is about half that of other squadrons. All data collected as part 
of this study is contained in Appendix A. 
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C. PHASE INSPECTION ALTERNATIVE 
With the baseline data established, it is necessary to create an alternative case for 
comparison to complete the capability gap analysis. To determine the alternative case, the 
IMDS ground station data was used to determine the necessity of all actions that take 
place during a phase inspection. Once the IMDS data was reviewed, an alternative phase 
structure was proposed. Using this phase structure proposal, metrics from the baseline 
case that were related to labor hours and flight hours were applied to make a reasonable 
estimation of the effort to complete phases under the alternative case. Next, availability 
due to phase maintenance was determined using the results of the labor hour estimates. 
Finally, the flight safety record was reviewed and results applied to determine the 
possible safety implications of using the alternative case. 
1. IMDS Data 
A review of the IMDS ground station data was conducted to determine the ability 
of IMDS to identify system faults and determine the need to inspect systems monitored 
by IMDS. As discussed earlier in the IMDS Ground Station section, IMDS data was 
compiled from several components throughout the aircraft. This data can be found in 
Appendix B, listed by BUNO number and component. The following components were 
chosen for review, as they provide an accurate cross-section of all IMDS monitored 
systems: main rotor, tail rotor, disconnect coupling (tail drive shafts), and input modules 
(engine output shafts).   
As discussed in the IMD-HUMS section of Chapter III, any time an aircraft is 
operated with IMDS, events are automatically recorded and stored in the DTU. This 
information is then passed to GS through the PCMCIA cards and catalogued for trend 
analysis. Using this trend data, it is possible to view the performance between phase 
inspections to determine the performance of aircraft components and predict possible 
failures. Trend data was available for all IMDS aircraft during the timeframe of this 
study, although some specific data points were not available. For each aircraft, all MDAT 
data (excluding main rotor) was analyzed to determine the highest recorded value, mean, 
standard deviation, and trend.  
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Main Rotor data was located in the ground station, with the average value 
between phases and maximum reading for an individual flight recorded. All data was 
compared to the non-operable flight limit for the component and RPM from the VIB-200 
(NAVAIR 2010). These limits represent a reasonable threshold for maintenance action as 
by definition, they are below the level where early deterioration of the component will 
occur (NAVAIR 2010). These limits can be found in Appendix B as part the monitored 
systems data record. An aircraft component was determined to require all phase 
inspections related to that component if there was a consistent exceedance of the non-
operable flight limit. A consistent exceedance is defined as a recorded limit exceedance 
on multiple consecutive days or an increasing trend approaching the limit over a longer 
time span. 
Only aircraft from HSC-3 and HSC-8 were IMDS capable, and the results showed 
very few trends exceeding the applicable limits. For HSC-3, five aircraft were analyzed 
over the course of 14 phase inspections, totaling 74 components. Within this group, a 
total of nine systems exceeded the non-operable flight limit at any time. Of this smaller 
group, only one exceedance was consistently observed and would require additional 
inspection during phase. HSC-8 had data available for a total of six aircraft, 14 phases, 
and 82 components. From this group, eight systems exceeded the limits at any time, with 
only four systems meeting the criteria for additional inspection. 
The small number of systems requiring further inspection and the lack of any 
aircraft requiring inspection of multiple monitored systems concurrently greatly reduced 
the need for inspection of IMDS monitored systems.  For this reason, the alternative case 
recommends the elimination of phase inspections on IMDS monitored components 
without clear need in the data trend record. The alternative case eliminates these 
inspections from the phase cycle and implements a much greater CBM capability. 
2. Alternative Phase Inspections 
After reviewing the IMDS ground station data, it is clear that IMDS provides the 
ability to implement CBM under its current usage. This CBM implementation does not 
mean that all parts of the phase inspections can be eliminated, as the phases still contains 
 89 
necessary inspections and servicing that IMDS is not currently capable of replacing. For 
the alternative case, all inspections related to IMDS monitored systems were removed, 
leaving behind a residual inspection to be conducted on non-monitored systems. This 
alternative phase should still occur at 175 flight hour intervals, but should include only 
the inspections found in Table 18.  The alternative Phase found in Table 18 includes all 
inspections to be conducted on each phase, with the ability to include additional 
inspections as IMDS trends require. 
Table 18.   Alternative Phase Inspections. 
 









































Main Rotor Damper System Drain
Environmental Control System
Main Landing Gear
Tail Landing Gear Shock Strut
No Additional Inspections





Tail Landing Gear Structure
IGB/TGB Oil Change





Airframe Inspections (Cockpit, Cabin and Tail Cone/Pylon)
Fire Extinguishing System




Main Gear Box Radiator
Access Panels Removal and Inspection
Airframe Inspections (Cabin, Transition Section, Tail Cone, Main Rotor Pylon, Tail Pylon)




Utility Hydraulic System Sampling
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The total expected labor hours for each phase can be seen in Table 18, and there is 
a significant reduction in inspection hours from Table 2. Additionally, the elimination of 
inspections on IMDS monitored components eliminates the need for post-phase vibration 
analysis. The current post-phase vibration analysis is mandated by the VIB-100 and VIB-
200 after the completion of certain maintenance actions. These actions requiring vibration 
analysis have been eliminated from the phase inspection, therefore no vibration analysis, 
or FCF, is required. Post phase FCF would only be required due to a 30-day no-fly 
period, the chances of which would be greatly reduced under this alternative maintenance 
scheme. The following section on Earned Value presents a detailed comparison of the 
baseline and alternative phase schemes. 
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D. EARNED VALUE 
As Langford and Franck noted, the goal of EVM is to “suggest how management 
can obtain the best-value solution for the taxpayer’s money” (Langford and Franck 2009, 
4). Through the course of the gap analysis, a clear CBM capability gap was identified in 
the MH-60S. This gap was related to the failure of the maintenance process to maximize 
the use of CBM tools. As was discussed as part of the CBA baseline, IMDS provides 
minimal capability in its current usage. In order to maximize the value of IMDS, a new 
maintenance process must be implemented. An alternative process was conceived using 
the IMDS ground station data to tailor the current phase process and reduce cost is terms 
of labor and flight hours. The question remains, however, what is the value of 
implementing the alternative phase model? To answer this question, the work of 
Langford and Franck, discussed in Chapter III, was applied to the baseline and alternative 
cases to find the value of closing the CBM capability gap. 
1. Assumptions and Methods 
The data found in Tables 13-17 provides a great deal of insight into the 
assumptions that can be made about maintenance labor usage. Since the baseline phase 
model includes a “look” and “fix” phase, actual labor hour usage varies greatly for each 
phase. Since no phase takes the exact amount of time listed in Table 2, it is unreasonable 
to assume that alternative case labor hours should be taken at face value. The expected 
hours must be adjusted to reflect the reality of maintenance, and the metric “Actual-
Expected Labor Hours Difference” from Table 13 provides the basis for such an 
adjustment. Using the average of this metric for each phase type, by squadron, a realistic 
adjustment of expected phase labor hours can be made.  
Adjusting the alternative case using the “Actual-Expected Labor Hours 
Difference” metric allows maintenance actions that correct discrepancies found during a 
phase to be captured. Even though there is not an exact linear relationship between phase 
labor hours and each inspection, this method provides an accurate measure from the 
available data. It is impossible to predict without monitoring capability which systems 
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will require repair during a phase, so an estimate must be made for the repairs that will 
take place. 
Other assumptions that are made concern the MDT and FCF flight hour usage 
under the alternate model. Since maintenance requiring FCF is eliminated from the phase 
inspections, post-phase FCF hours are assumed to be eliminated. Review of the IMDS 
ground station data substantiates this assumption, as only five systems out of 156 
warranted additional inspection during the study timeframe. Since adjustments are made 
to these IMDS monitored systems during FCF, these figures would likely rise under a 
CBM alternative. Conversely, no aircraft required multiple additional inspections, so any 
inspections that lead to FCF in the future are likely to be greatly reduced in number. FCF 
hours would not be eliminated, but the variable nature of the FCF under the alternate 
model along with the greatly reduced frequency implies that FCFs should be omitted 
from these calculations. 
MDT must be adjusted as well as FCF hours based on the labor requirements 
under the alternate model. For this study, labor hours available for phase were 30 per day 
for all calculations of MDT. The 30 labor hours figure is similar to the efficiency 
achieved in conjunction with phases with the collected data lasting less than 21 days, 
which the alternative model is very likely to achieve. In addition MDT was calculated 
from the completion of the last flight prior to phase induction until phase completion, 
excluding post-phase FCF. This change is justified for the same reasons as the 
elimination of post-phase FCF calculations. All aircraft were considered ready for 
operational tasking on the date of the completion of all projected phase labor hours under 
the alternate model. 
These assumptions were applied to each squadron to determine the value of 
conversion to CBM between the baseline and alternate models. The final assumption was 
that all aircraft will be IMDS equipped in the alternate case. This assumption is necessary 
because IMDS allows CBM capability. If IMDS is not installed, there can be no CBM 
capability, and thus no difference from the baseline case. 
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2. Earned Value Calculations 
Applying the earned value calculations from Langford and Franck from Chapter 
III, it is possible to determine the value of closing the CBM capability gap. The equation 
from Figure 2 is: 
 
The value of the function F(t) is the value of closing the capability gap. I(t) represents 
investment, labor hours in this case, used to produce performance in functional terms. 
The functional performance in this case is flight hours, which is fixed at 175 per phase 
less the number of post-phase FCF hours. Therefore, the value of closing the gap is the 
difference in operational flight hours per maintenance labor hour between the baseline 
and alternative models.  
Table 19 presents the value calculations for the baseline and alternate models. The 
calculations in Table 19 reveal that under the baseline case, the value of each phase 
maintenance labor hour is between 0.185 and 0.897 flight hours, with an average of 0.351 
across all squadrons and phases. In the alternative case, the value of one phase 
maintenance labor hour is between 0.806 and 2.051 flight hours, with an average of 1.097 
flight hours per labor hour for all phases across all squadrons. 
Langford and Franck also propose the use of quality to determine the worth in gap 
analysis.  This equation is included in Figure 3, and provides that differences in quality 
can lead to differences in the worth of a capability to a squadron. Safety would be the 
best measure of quality available, as fewer operational system failures would lead to an 
increase in the quality of performance. Due to the fact that CBM is not currently used on 
the MH-60S, there is no data available that provides the rate of component failures under 
a CBM regime. For this reason, the safety of flight data is much more useful as an 
indicator of component quality and not maintenance process quality, except in the cases 
of human maintenance error. Put another way, there is not any data on safety under a 
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CBM regime, so any alternative scenario that attempts to capture the quality of safety is 
conjecture at best. 
Table 19.   Value Calculations. 
 
 
The comparison of value under the baseline and alternative case provides that 
there is a significant value to closing the CBM capability gap. It is also important to 
investigate the savings for each squadron in absolute terms. Tables 20 and 21 provide the 
total savings in terms of labor hours, flight hours, and availability under the alternate 
model in comparison to the baseline model. 
  
HSC-3 A AVG 419.2 170.2 0.406 182.5 175.0 0.959
HSC-3 B AVG 362.5 168.1 0.464 125.9 175.0 1.390
HSC-3 C AVG 402.9 168.9 0.419 164.8 175.0 1.062
HSC-3 D AVG 911.1 168.8 0.185 217.1 175.0 0.806
HSC-3 AVG Phase 536.6 169.1 0.315 172.6 175.0 1.014
HSC-3 Total Cycle 2095.8 676.1 0.323 690.3 700.0 1.014
HSC-8 A AVG 471.4 172.3 0.365 156.3 175.0 1.120
HSC-8 B AVG 296.9 171.5 0.578 89.6 175.0 1.953
HSC-8 C AVG 186.7 167.5 0.897 85.3 175.0 2.051
HSC-8 D AVG 554.8 167.2 0.301 131.9 175.0 1.326
HSC-8 AVG Phase 382.4 170.1 0.445 119.5 175.0 1.464
HSC-8 Total Cycle 1509.8 678.5 0.449 506.8 700.0 1.381
HSC-21 A AVG 438.0 167.2 0.382 197.5 175.0 0.886
HSC-21 B AVG 465.2 169.6 0.365 160.2 175.0 1.093
HSC-21 C AVG 230.0 171.0 0.743 100.0 175.0 1.749
HSC-21 D AVG 709.1 167.9 0.237 177.7 175.0 0.985
HSC-21 AVG Phase 479.7 168.8 0.352 168.9 175.0 1.036
HSC-21 Total Cycle 1842.2 675.6 0.367 662.7 700.0 1.056
A AVG 420.4 170.2 0.405 178.4 175.0 0.981
B AVG 352.2 169.7 0.482 119.1 175.0 1.469
C AVG 323.3 168.9 0.522 132.8 175.0 1.318
D AVG 786.3 168.5 0.214 187.9 175.0 0.931
All AVG Phase 482.6 169.3 0.351 159.6 175.0 1.097


























HSC-3 63 42 6 0.602 0.914 
HSC-8 123 48 4 0.721 0.968 
HSC-21 84 24 6 0.775 0.933 
All 
Squadrons 89 40 6 0.690 0.937 
 
 















HSC-3 A  176.1 419.2 13 3160.7 57.8 
HSC-3 B  125.9 362.5 8 1892.5 54.9 
HSC-3 C  164.8 402.9 9 2143.3 54.5 
HSC-3 D  217.1 911.1 11 7634.4 67.7 
HSC-3 Total 683.9 2095.8 41 14830.9 234.9 
HSC-8 A  150.8 471.4 5 1602.9 14.7 
HSC-8 B  89.6 296.9 6 1243.7 19.2 
HSC-8 C  85.3 186.7 4 405.5 30.6 
HSC-8 D  131.9 554.8 5 2114.4 33.7 
HSC-8 Total 457.7 1509.8 20 5366.5 98.2 
HSC-21 A  190.5 438.0 3 742.5 23.4 
HSC-21 B  160.2 465.2 3 915.0 10.8 
HSC-21 C  100.0 230.0 3 389.8 12.1 
HSC-21 D  177.7 709.1 4 2125.4 28.5 
HSC-21 Total 628.4 1842.2 13 4172.7 74.8 
All A 172.1 420.4 20 4965.4 95.9 
All B 119.1 352.2 16 3729.0 84.9 
All C 132.8 323.3 16 3048.8 97.2 
All D 187.9 786.3 20 11966.8 129.9 
All Total 612.0 1882.2 72 23710.0 407.9 
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3. Flight Safety 
Analysis of the flight safety data reveals very little in terms of a comparison 
between the baseline and alternative models for aircraft maintenance presented in this 
study. The sample of HAZREP statistics available since 2009 includes a total of 487 
flight incidents in the MH-60S. Of these 487 incidents, only 40 had a direct mechanical 
cause, which in this case means failure of a system or component monitored by IMDS. 
These 40 incidents included only 16 aircraft that had IMDS installed, so the sample of 
IMDS monitored incidents is very small. By comparison, only 40 percent of all aircraft 
reporting a mechanical failure had IMDS to 60 percent without IMDS, but IMDS is 
typically installed on newer aircraft. One statistic of note is that 25 of the 40 mechanical 
incidents were related to human maintenance error. This means that about 62.5 percent of 
all MH-60S HAZREPs are caused by a failure of maintenance personnel.   
The three metrics discussed in relation to flight safety are: ratio of mechanical 
failure to total incidents, percentage of mechanical failure with IMDS installed, and 
percentage of incidents involving human error. Since the mechanical failure ratio is 8.2 
percent of all incidents over five years, aircraft components have a very low failure rate. 
Additionally, since the human failure rate of this subset of incidents in 62.5 percent, only 
15 incidents in four years are related to mechanical failure alone. This statistic suggests 
that there is no significant increase in risk to aircraft of converting to CBM, due to the 
low failure rate of components.  
IMDS in conjunction with CBM replaces inspections and provides a constant 
monitoring capability. This monitoring capability coupled with the lower rate of 
mechanical failures on IMDS aircraft than non-IMDS aircraft suggests that safety would 
not be compromised in any meaningful way by converting to a CBM process. 
Conversely, the lower number of inspections might actually increase safety by reducing 
the largest cause of mechanical failures, human maintenance error. 
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E. RESIDUAL CAPABILITY GAPS 
In Chapter I, there were four major research questions that were posed. Questions 
3 and 4 are directly related to the presence of a residual capability gap. Those questions 
are: 
 To what extent is there a gap between current capabilities and the 
requirement to meet the Navy’s stated goal of maximizing the use of CBM 
at the organizational level?  
 Are there any possible solutions that may have been overlooked that could 
be more effective than the maintenance processes currently in use or 
development?  
The former question above seeks to determine how much the gap analysis succeeded in 
closing the CBM capability gap. If IMDS is used to the maximum extent possible, the 
answer to this question is yes, CBM has been maximized in the MH-60S. On the other 
hand, the answer to the second question is yes, there are solutions that have been 
overlooked. By the nature of the NAMP discussed in Chapter II, there is no serious 
consideration of a NAMP alternative besides CBM. For this reason, CBM tools are the 
only ones currently available for consideration in constructing alternatives. On the other 
hand, CBM is by no means perfect and there is a large space to explore involving 
alternatives to the NAMP that fall outside of the CBM structure. 
The structure of the alternate phase model reveals CBM cannot replace all of the 
inspections that are conducted during a phase using IMDS in its current state. This does 
not necessarily represent a gap in capability that has a value to close. Review of the 
residual phase inspections under the alternate model shows that many of the inspections 
likely should not be replaced with CBM. For example, a CBM capability to monitor 
hydraulic system fluid is not likely worth the expense when sampling is effective and less 
expensive. It must also be recognized that a non-CBM alternative, such as development 
of new aircraft systems which require less servicing could also close this residual gap. In 
the MH-60S, for example, a fly-by-wire control capability could lessen the need for 
complex hydraulic systems. In turn, this would reduce the need for many of the current 
maintenance inspections without the use of CBM. 
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One on the primary ways to further increase the value of CBM would be to lessen 
the frequency of some inspections common to all phases. For instance, 67.8 hours of 
inspection are common to all phases even under the alternate model. Inspections of 
components such as the stabilator or landing gear could be lessened in frequency without 
an event-based need. That is to say, without exceeding landing limits or a stabilator 
malfunction, these systems are unlikely to require inspection every 175 flight hours. 
Additionally, the shortened phases could be combined into larger inspections at greater 
intervals to further reduce the frequency of inspection and maintenance down time. 
The greatest capability gap that stills exists after CBM implementation is a gap 
identified under the current maintenance process, i.e., the lack of catastrophic failure 
prediction. There is currently no system on the MH-60S that monitors the physical 
condition of components. Mishap data, although not revealed in this study, does include 
incidents of catastrophic component failure with little or no warning to operators. These 
incidents of physical component failure have not been predicted by IMDS or detected 
through the inspection process.   
The MH-60S tail rotor is especially vulnerable to physical stresses, and a 
capability of monitoring the physical condition of tail rotor components would improve 
safety but is outside the realm of CBM. Engine power output is also not monitored by 
IMDS on a consistent basis. Currently, power checks are completed prior to flight 
comparing torque and turbine gas temperature to track engine performance. These health 
indicator tests from the NATOPS flight manual are conducted at a single fixed power 
setting which is often well below the operating parameters used in flight. Development of 
more robust engine monitoring could provide a greater CBM capability for diagnosing 
impending engine failures. 
These ideas and other future extensions should be considered, but are outside the 
scope of this study. In the end, the capability to maintain aircraft available for operational 
tasking is met by the current NAMP process and CBM alternative. In terms of meeting the 
functional requirements of “to maintain,” CBM provides a more valuable capability than 
the current NAMP. Further, there is no residual CBM capability gap under the alternative 
case per se, but there are areas for even greater CBM usage not presented in this study. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of the results from Chapter V reveals that there is a definite value to 
implementing CBM in the MH-60S. Statistical analysis of aircraft performance with 
IMDS installed to aircraft without IMDS installed revealed that MOPs were equal at the 
95 percent confidence level. As the maintenance program of the MH-60S is currently 
structured, all aircraft are maintained under the same process regardless of IMDS 
capability. There is a small, statistically significant benefit to the current use of IMDS in 
the MH-60S. This benefit is based mostly on the efficiency achieved while conducting 
the post-phase vibration analysis and FCFs. 
The results of this study revealed that in order to achieve a much greater benefit 
from the use of the IMDS system, it is necessary to implement a more robust CBM 
regime. The most significant part of any CBM program would be to minimize the amount 
of phase maintenance inspections on IMDS monitored components in the MH-60S. To 
determine the structure of an alternative CBM process, a capability gap analysis was used 
in accordance with the JCIDS Capabilities Based Assessment Guide in Chapter IV. This 
capability gap analysis was then used to determine the value earned by implementing a 
CBM alternative to the extant NAMP process.  
The final results of the gap analysis determined that a CBM capability gap does 
exist between the Navy’s desired aircraft maintenance process and the extant NAMP 
process. Through the use of data collected at the operational level from the MH-60S, the 
value of closing this gap was determined for a sample of aircraft within the HSCWP. Use 
of IMDS ground station data validated the ability of IMDS to monitor components and 
determine when additional maintenance actions were required for these components. This 
IMDS ability enabled the elimination of most phase inspections unless a specific 
component need was identified by IMDS.   
Through using data collected from a sampling of MH-60S aircraft within the 
HSCWP, a baseline of current maintenance process performance was created. This 
baseline assessed measures of maintenance performance related to labor hours, flight 
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hours, availability and safety. The alternative maintenance case developed in Chapter V 
built upon the idea that the maximum benefit is attained by a re-engineering of the phase 
maintenance process. The alternative case was based on the elimination of inspections to 
IMDS monitored components and systems without an identified need. Current phase 
inspections of IMDS monitored components were determined to be needed only when a 
consistent exceedance of non-operable flight limits was identified. IMDS provides a 
robust ability to monitor and track trends in component and system performance, and this 
ability makes the alternative case feasible. This baseline was then compared to the 
alternative case to determine the differences in maintenance performance between the 
two models. In terms availability, flight hour usage and maintenance labor hour usage, 
the alternative case performed significantly better than the baseline case. 
Using the data collected from operations over 13 months within the HSCWP, the 
value of the baseline and alternative cases were compared. Value was assessed based on a 
comparison of flight hours created per labor hour used to facilitate phase inspections. The 
result of this comparison was an average increase from 0.36 flight hours produced per 
labor hour under the baseline case to 1.073 flight hours produced under the alternative 
case. Additionally, implementation of the alternative case would result in a decrease in 
usage by 23,710 labor hours per year for the entire sample population. Flight hours 
available for operational tasking would increase by up to 3.24 percent, for a total of 382 
flight hours across the entire sample population. On an average per-aircraft basis, each 
aircraft would attain an additional 5.7 flight hours for operational tasking per 175 flight 
hour phase cycle. The increase in flight hours is a direct result of the decrease in the need 
for post-phase vibration analysis and FCF due to changes in phase inspections. 
Operational availability as a result of phase maintenance would increase from 
0.69 to 0.937 on average for the entire sample population. In terms of availability, this 
change means that aircraft would be available for operational tasking on 93.7 percent of 
all days instead of 69 percent as a result of current phase inspections. Other factors affect 
the achieved operational availability, but the main cause of MH-60S unavailability is 
phase maintenance. 
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Finally, a review of the available flight safety data revealed that there was no 
greater risk to equipment by replacing inspection with IMDS monitoring. The flight 
safety data suggests that the majority of mechanical failures in the MH-60S were caused 
by human error in the maintenance process. Additionally, the relatively low number of 
mechanical failures in the MH-60S suggests that component quality does not require the 
level of inspection for which the NAMP phase maintenance process was designed. 
A. STUDY EXTENSIONS 
This study was conceived to determine the gap in capability to perform CBM at 
the operational maintenance level and the value attained by closing that gap. As the 
results show, this study succeeded in identifying that gap and proposing a solution to 
achieve value in the process. This study was limited to three helicopter squadrons that 
currently fly the MH-60S, all within the same administrative aviation wing on the West 
Coast. The HSCWP has 10 squadrons in its current configuration, so one logical 
extension would be to perform this study on all aircraft within the HSCWP. By 
expanding this study’s methods to include all squadrons, a much more robust 
understanding of the value of CBM and IMDS could be attained. Due to the operational 
commitments of the squadrons in the HSCWP, this level of depth was impossible for this 
study using the most current data. Therefore, any extension of this study to include all of 
the HSCWP would require the storage of more than 12 months of maintenance data for 
all squadrons. Increasing the timeline would provide a more robust data set and longer-
term histories of maintenance performance for individual aircraft and squadrons as a 
whole. 
This study created a CBM alternative that was based on an evolution of the 
current NAMP phase process. As part of this study, the phase process was changed very 
little. Instead, the components of phase inspections were altered to reduce maintenance 
work-load and increase CBM. Furthermore, this study focused only on phase inspections 
and made no effort to alter the myriad of other conditional and special inspections 
required by the NAMP. A reasonable extension of this study would be to apply the same 
methods that were applied to phase inspections to special and conditional inspections. 
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Increasing the scope of this study would provide others areas within the NAMP where 
value could be attained by increasing CBM. 
The final logical extension of this study would include a comparison of the 
NAMP process to the other service’s maintenance processes. The H-60 provides an ideal 
platform for this extension, as the aircraft is flown by the Army, Navy, Air Force and 
Coast Guard. Comparison of these various processes would provide a robust series of 
alternatives to consider the efficacy of CBM. Moreover, the study of multiple current 
alternatives could provide the ability to create a hybrid process which utilizes the best 
practices of extant processes in conjunction with CBM. Through the large number of 
alternatives available in this comparison, a much better process could be developed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the findings of this study, there are two primary recommendations 
that would improve the efficiency of Naval Aviation maintenance. These changes include 
the installation of IMDS on all MH-60S aircraft and a conversion to a CBM process to 
replace many current NAMP processes. The first recommendation is to increase the 
usage of IMDS in all MH-60S aircraft. Currently, the IMDS is not installed in all MH-
60S, as is evidenced by the aircraft sample used in this study. It is clear that value does 
exist by converting to a CBM process, and that the Navy desires to attain this value. The 
IMDS is currently the only system in service that is capable of facilitating CBM in the 
MH-60S. Therefore, a great amount of value could be achieved by increasing the 
prevalence of IMDS in the MH-60S. 
The second recommendation is to increase the use of CBM in place of the current 
NAMP maintenance processes. The value that is provided by IMDS, as this study clearly 
shows, can only be achieved by a conversion to a CBM process. CBM provides the 
ability to greatly minimize maintenance effort based on aircraft need. The current NAMP 
process has served the Navy well, but was definitively not designed with modern aircraft 
systems in mind. The use of inspections as the basis for maintaining aircraft has provided 
an excellent maintenance capability. On the other hand, modern systems which can 
constantly monitor performance provide a much more robust and accurate measure of 
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component performance than a periodic human inspection.  Since these inspections are 
based on human measurement, the inspections are subject to human error. As the safety 
record indicates, if an aircraft system or component experiences a mechanical failure, it is 
most likely due to human error in the maintenance process.   
The major question left unresolved by this study is what a CBM process would 
actually entail. The alternative CBM proposed by this study simply alters the current 
phase process to make more use of IMDS tools. In many ways, this alternative process is 
just a step in the evolution of CBM within the Navy. It is important to take that first step, 
but the alternative proposed in this study should not be taken as a final solution to CBM 
implementation. Much like the NAMP recognizes, process improvement is constant, and 
CBM will greatly evolve once the first steps in the direction of CBM are taken. 
There is a vast improvement in system monitoring and diagnostic capability 
provided by IMDS over human inspections. Human inspection still does provide a great 
capability to augment automatic monitoring and would continue to do so under a CBM 
process. The accumulation of evidence, however, definitively shows that systematic 
monitoring and diagnostics, such as that provided by IMDS, greatly improves both 
performance and safety. A failure to recognize this fact or a reluctance to alter processes 
that are “good enough” will continue to cause waste and stress the limited resources of 
the DOD. 
Installing IMDS on all MH-60S aircraft and converting to CBM will not come 
without costs. There will be a dollar cost associated with the installation and maintenance 
of the IMDS system. These monetary costs do seem as if they would be more than offset 
by the savings provided by a CBM process, but most cost related to IMDS would be 
incurred as part of the installation process.   
Other costs associated with the change in culture at the operational level will be 
less monetary. Since the NAMP has been in place for over 50 years, all current Navy 
maintenance personnel are familiar and comfortable with the process. This trust in the 
NAMP processes will be difficult to overcome and will require great effort. Any new 
maintenance process must be allowed to experience the set-backs that will undoubtedly 
 104 
occur. This emotional and economic investment is inevitable to increase the benefits of 
altering the maintenance process for future generation of aircraft. The current way of 
doing business in naval aviation has in many ways reached the breaking point, and the 
current fiscal reality does not support the continued use of expensive, outdated practices. 
The conversion of the MH-60S to CBM will allow maintenance departments to gain 
comfort in a new model on a familiar airframe. This comfort level will make the 
transition much smoother for future generations and greatly improve the war fighting 
capability of the U.S. Navy. 
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APPENDIX A. MAINTENANCE DATA. 
Appendix A contains data related to maintenance labor hours, flight hours and 
availability.  Labor hour data was attained from the OOMA records of each squadron, 
and flight hour data from SHARP databases.  Flight Safety data is privileged and 




Aircraft BUNO IMDS FCF Complete Phase Start Phase End TBM Phase Type Phase Labor Hours Phase FCF Hours Days Unavailable Special Type Special Date
01 165756 N 5/16/2013 C 364 5/11/2014
10/10/2013 7/16/2013 9/20/2013 39 D 1200.7 6.8 86 546 9/19/2013
2/13/2014 1/25/2014 2/7/2014 107 A 424.8 1.5 19 728 4/25/2014
5/30/2014 5/2/2014 5/14/2014 78 B 283.1 9.6 28
396 1908.6 17.9 133
07 166323 Y 5/11/2012 B 364 3/19/2014
8/10/2012 C 546 3/5/2014
12/11/2012 D 728 9/13/2012
7/18/2014 6/20/2014 6/30/2014 N/A A 261.1 4.3 28
08 166313 Y 6/13/2013 A 364 2/8/2014
10/23/2013 8/28/2013 9/23/2013 44 B 197.7 6.6 56 546 2/5/2014
2/12/2014 1/22/2014 2/5/2014 91 C 618.9 3.9 21 728 3/10/2013
5/29/2014 4/23/2014 5/19/2014 70 D 890.1 3.5 36
396 1706.7 14 113
09 166317 Y 10/30/2013 10/1/2013 10/11/2013 57 A 509.9 2.3 29 364 1/9/2014
1/28/2014 1/17/2014 1/24/2014 79 B 230.8 3 11 546 6/1/2014
4/2/2014 3/10/2014 3/20/2014 41 C 419.6 7.7 23 728 3/13/2014
6/14/2014 5/10/2014 6/2/2014 38 D 455.1 4.8 35
256 1615.4 17.8 98
11 166344 Y 12/9/2011 B 364 7/10/2013
5/2/2012 C 546 5/13/2013
5/10/2014 8/8/2013 4/2/2014 36 D 807.7 9 272 728 7/6/2013
7/29/2014 7/1/2014 7/10/2014 52 A 194.2 4.6 28
396 1001.9 13.6 300
12 166335 Y 9/5/2013 6/20/2013 8/13/2013 78 A 647.4 5.3 77 364 6/25/2014
12/4/2013 11/14/2013 11/25/2013 70 B 285.1 2.3 20 546 6/19/2014
Key 3/11/2014 2/21/2014 3/4/2014 79 C 445 5.6 18 728 11/20/2013
Non-IMDS No Data IMDS 7/22/2014 4/8/2014 6/21/2014 28 D 1669.6 5.8 105




Aircraft BUNO IMDS FCF Complete Phase Start Phase End TBM Phase Type Phase Labor Hours Phase FCF Hours Days Unavailable Special Type Special Date
14 166350 N 9/13/2012 B 364 6/2/2014
3/5/2013 C 546 5/8/2014
6/14/2013 D 728 12/1/2012
6/16/2014 8/5/2013 5/29/2014 35 A 461.9 7.5 311
15 166365 N 4/30/2013 B 364 12/17/2013
8/20/2013 7/13/2013 7/31/2013 65 C 545.7 7 38 546 4/26/2013
1/9/2014 10/26/2013 11/22/2013 67 D 775.6 11.1 75 728 10/20/2013
PMI 2/15/2014 2/26/2014 37 A 394.2 N/A N/A
217 1715.5 18.1 113
16 166343 N 2/8/2012 B 364 10/18/2013
6/11/2012 C 546 4/16/2014
10/16/2012 D 728 8/13/2013
5/9/2014 4/1/2014 4/17/2014 N/A A 653.6 6.1 38
17 166369 N 11/18/2013 10/18/2013 11/13/2013 58 D 667.6 2.9 31 364 2/11/2014
2/6/2014 1/24/2014 2/3/2014 67 A 368.3 6.3 13 546 7/30/2013
5/9/2014 4/4/2014 4/29/2014 57 B 397 6.1 35 728 1/29/2014
7/28/2014 6/28/2014 7/9/2014 50 C 222.5 7.7 30
286 1655.4 23 109
20 165754 N 6/3/2011 B 364 3/21/2014
11/10/2011 C 546 3/6/2014
4/15/2014 3/12/2014 3/26/2014 PMI D 981.1 7.5 33 728 4/26/2014
7/10/2014 6/12/2014 6/23/2014 58 A 443.9 1.5 28
142 1425 9 61
23 166306 N 10/25/2013 9/28/2013 10/16/2013 57 A 276.1 10.7 27 364 8/11/2013
2/1/2014 12/12/2013 1/2/2014 48 B 577.9 10.2 51 546 1/23/2014
4/22/2014 3/18/2014 3/28/2014 45 C 246.2 8.8 35 728 8/10/2012
6/30/2014 5/31/2014 6/16/2014 39 D 564.7 5.9 30
275 1664.9 35.6 143
24 166370 N 11/23/2013 9/26/2013 10/31/2013 48 D 1343.5 3.2 58 364 5/21/2014
3/5/2014 1/30/2014 2/12/2014 68 A 383 4.7 34 546 10/30/2013
5/14/2014 4/14/2014 5/5/2014 40 B 405 4.5 30 728 2/7/2014
8/4/2014 7/12/2014 7/17/2014 59 C 232.7 4.1 23
312 2364.2 16.5 145
28 165747 N 9/6/2012 A 364 1/29/2014
3/12/2013 B 546 1/7/2014
2/24/2014 8/1/2013 1/9/2014 83 C 515.4 7.2 207 728 11/14/2012
7/8/2014 5/21/2014 6/10/2014 86 D 666.7 7.2 48
396 1182.1 14.4 255
30 166293 N 1/23/2013 D 364 6/3/2014
9/18/2013 8/25/2013 9/16/2013 199 A 431.8 3 24 546 9/16/2013
Key 1/18/2014 12/6/2013 12/13/2013 79 B 523.2 12.6 43 728 3/31/2014
Non-IMDS No Data IMDS 5/9/2014 4/4/2014 4/23/2014 78 C 380.3 2.5 35






Aircraft BUNO IMDS? FCF Complete Phase Start Phase Complete Phase Type TBM Phase Labor Hours Phase FCF Hours Days Unavailable
610 167869 Y 9/21/2012 A
1/20/2013 B
10/10/2013 8/29/2013 9/25/2013 C 220 296.9 8.2 42
3/20/2014 2/21/2014 3/18/2014 D 134 647.4 2.6 27
396 944.3 10.8 69
611 168394 Y 2/25/2013 C
8/6/2013 7/9/2013 8/1/2013 D 132 576.8 3.8 28
11/7/2013 10/17/2013 10/31/2013 A 72 178.9 3.7 21
4/3/2014 3/13/2014 3/25/2014 B 126 207.8 1.5 21
396 963.5 9 70
612 166311 N 12/16/2011 D
6/20/2013 A
3/18/2014 11/20/2013 11/27/2013 B 148 132.5 5.2 118
7/18/2014 6/25/2014 7/7/2014 C 99 173.3 12.3 23
396 305.8 17.5 141
613 168395 Y 3/8/2013 C
9/10/2013 8/6/2013 9/3/2013 D 142 683.1 4.8 35
1/28/2014 1/14/2014 1/27/2014 A 126 152.1 2.2 14
6/2/2014 5/15/2014 5/29/2014 B 107 302 2.2 18
396 1137.2 9.2 67
614 167875 Y 1/6/2013 C
5/23/2013 D
11/22/2013 11/12/2013 11/20/2013 A 120 184.8 2.4 10
4/16/2014 3/27/2014 4/11/2014 B 125 142.5 3 20
396 327.3 5.4 30
615 166357 Y 7/25/2011 C
3/24/2012 D
8/1/2013 7/1/2013 7/30/2013 A 242 1402.7 3.8 31
10/29/2013 10/9/2013 10/23/2013 B 69 445.2 3.8 20
396 1847.9 7.6 51
616 167859 Y 1/23/2013 B
3/22/2013 C
3/3/2014 9/10/2013 2/18/2014 D 157 504.6 9.4 174
6/12/2014 5/28/2014 6/8/2014 A 86 145.9 2.6 14
396 650.5 12 188
617 167867 Y 2/13/2013 D
6/13/2013 A
1/7/2014 11/19/2013 12/19/2013 B 152 462.2 3.5 49
5/1/2014 4/10/2014 4/22/2014 C 93 230.7 5.3 21
396 692.9 8.8 70
620 166307 N 11/22/2011 A
2/28/2012 B
Key 10/2/2013 8/6/2013 9/18/2013 C 90 156.1 4.8 57
Non-IMDS No Data IMDS 6/17/2014 11/19/2013 5/12/2014 D 48 454.8 13.1 210





Aircraft BUNO IMDS FCF Complete Phase Start Phase Complete Phase Type TBM Phase Labor Hours Phase FCF Hours Days Unavailable Special Type Special Date
76 166332 N 3/27/2013 B 364 12/19/2013
7/8/2013 6/10/2013 6/24/2013 C 67 398.6 3.9 28 546 11/1/2012
10/7/2013 9/8/2013 9/24/2013 D 62 410.9 9.3 29 728 10/30/2012
1/24/2014 12/15/2013 12/20/2013 A 69 373.4 14.3 41
396 1182.9 27.5 98
62 166348 N 1/10/2012 A 364 5/27/2014
5/9/2012 B 546 5/28/2014
12/26/2012 C 728 12/11/2012
7/25/2013 6/11/2013 7/15/2013 D 134 1305.8 9.8 44
396 1305.8 9.8 44
71 166362 N 10/7/2013 9/30/2013 10/5/2013 A 84 220.4 5.1 7 364 11/15/2013
11/25/2013 11/11/2013 11/17/2013 B 35 297.8 6.5 14 546 6/6/2013
3/1/2014 2/21/2014 2/28/2014 C 88 132.2 2.9 8 728 8/29/2013
7/10/2014 6/16/2014 7/2/2014 D 107 957.5 4.6 24
283 1607.9 19.1 53
70/75 166315 N 2/26/2013 A 364 7/9/2014
2/20/2014 1/29/2014 2/11/2014 B 117 543.9 4.3 22 546 2/13/2014
5/15/2014 5/6/2014 5/13/2014 C 75 159.1 5.3 9 728 2/19/2014
7/31/2014 7/10/2014 7/23/2014 D 56 162 4.8 21
396 865 14.4 52
74 166319 N 12/20/2011 C 364 1/31/2014
4/17/2013 D 546 12/3/2013
Key 12/13/2013 10/31/2013 11/26/2013 A 78 720.3 4 44 728 10/29/2012
Non-IMDS No Data IMDS PMI 4/7/2014 4/13/2014 B 115 553.8 N/A N/A





Aircraft BUNO IMDS Scheduled Hours Unscheduled Hours Total Labor Hours Total FCF Hours Total Flight Hours FCF/Flight Hours Scehdule Labor %
62 166348 N 1594.2 2823.3 4417.5 16.8 65.9 25.49% 36.09%
616 167859 Y 1708.9 1926.1 3635 16 261.1 6.13% 47.01%
20 165754 N 3896.2 3531.4 7427.6 10.3 247.4 4.16% 52.46%
14 166350 N 2328.2 2093.5 4421.7 14.4 319.3 4.51% 52.65%
612 166311 N 4078.9 3613.7 7692.6 19.5 141 13.83% 53.02%
617 167867 Y 2475.6 2063.7 4539.3 11.8 347.7 3.39% 54.54%
16 166343 N 4848.3 3965 8813.3 21.8 343.2 6.35% 55.01%
70/75 166315 N 5794.8 4310 10104.8 20.2 507.1 3.98% 57.35%
74 166319 N 4574.9 3337 7911.9 11.4 303.1 3.76% 57.82%
08 166313 Y 5458.6 3336.5 8795.1 32.1 606.8 5.29% 62.06%
620 166307 N 3557.1 2105.1 5662.2 13.1 62.8 20.86% 62.82%
11 166344 Y 3310 1924.1 5234.1 15.3 282 5.43% 63.24%
76 166332 N 3592.8 2060.7 5653.5 28.5 331.3 8.60% 63.55%
28 165747 N 4606.7 2526 7132.7 17.4 281.9 6.17% 64.59%
615 166357 Y 4346.6 2338.7 6685.3 3.1 14.3 21.68% 65.02%
614 167875 Y 2855.9 1505.9 4361.8 15.9 472 3.37% 65.48%
23 166306 N 6017.8 2853.2 8871 49.9 748.7 6.66% 67.84%
30 166293 N 5071.4 2386.4 7457.8 23.2 499.4 4.65% 68.00%
09 166317 Y 6515.9 3020.4 9536.3 39.9 868 4.60% 68.33%
12 166335 Y 6710.4 3094.4 9804.8 26 509.1 5.11% 68.44%
613 168395 Y 3674 1637.2 5311.2 16 492.9 3.25% 69.17%
17 166369 N 6549.2 2788.9 9338.1 29.4 751.1 3.91% 70.13%
71 166362 N 6728 2738.6 9466.6 53.9 752.8 7.16% 71.07%
24 166370 N 6778 2731.8 9509.8 26.9 693.5 3.88% 71.27%
15 166365 N 3828 1509.9 5337.9 28.9 366.5 7.89% 71.71%
611 168394 Y 3439.4 1293.5 4732.9 10.5 494.2 2.12% 72.67%
610 167869 Y 2684.7 959.9 3644.6 11.8 298.4 3.95% 73.66%
01 165756 N 5239.9 1803.9 7043.8 26.2 506.4 5.17% 74.39%
07 166323 Y 5401.1 607.5 6008.6 12.7 207.8 6.11% 89.89%
Key Total 127665.5 70886.3 198551.8 622.9 11775.7 5.29% 64.30%
non-IMDS IMDS Average 4402.3 2444.4 6846.6 21.5 406.1 5.29% 64.30%
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APPENDIX B. IMDS DATA 
Appendix B contains all IMDS Ground Station Data recorded from HSC-3 and 
HSC-8.  Main Rotor balance data was collected from the ground station in each squadron 
and tail rotor, input shaft, and disconnect coupling data were collected from IMDS 
MDAT databases.  BUNOs 166323, 166313, 166317, 166344, and 166335 were part of 
the HSC-3 inventory and BUNOs 167869, 168394, 168395, 167875, 166357, 167859, 
and 167867 were part of the HSC-8 inventory.  All exceedances of non-operable flight 




BUNO/System RPM Phase Start Date End Date High Value Mean STD DEV Limit Trend / Consistent Exceedance
166323
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 6/20/2014 0.207 0.101 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.284 0.209 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 1.026 0.1091 0.1128 0.55 No, Several Spikes above .45 on 4/24 and 4/28
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.2 0.0728 0.0272 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.636 0.2475 0.1477 1 No, Spike from .2 to .5 range after 6/20
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.17 0.0811 0.0315 0.86 None
166313
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 6/13/2013 8/28/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.449 0.1302 0.0507 0.55 No, Spike from .1 to .4 range on 8/20
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.0893 0.0454 0.01 1 No Trend
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.252 0.1206 0.0291 1 No Trend
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.197 0.0699 0.0355 0.86 No Trend
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 10/23/2013 1/22/2014 0.111 0.038 0.35 None, Data not available for entire period
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.225 0.133 0.3 None, Data not available for entire period
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.534 0.0969 0.0574 0.55 Spikes to .5 on 10/29 and .4 on 11/18
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.192 0.0765 0.0364 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.304 0.1502 0.0553 1 None, 0.12 trend up to 0.24 on 1/1/14 
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.19 0.0751 0.0351 0.86 None, Stable at .04 or .10
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 C 2/12/2014 4/23/2014 0.241 0.074 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.139 0.026 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.165 0.081 0.0235 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.212 0.0661 0.0529 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.376 0.2212 0.0427 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.174 0.0813 0.0284 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 5/29/2014 0.231 0.168 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.154 0.074 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.27 0.1271 0.0249 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.914 0.0901 0.0784 1 No, Spike to .7 on 7/29
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 1.961 0.0322 0.0155 1 No, Spike to 1.4 on 7/29




BUNO/System RPM Phase Start Date End Date High Value Mean STD DEV Limit Trend / Consistent Exceedance
166317
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 10/1/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.779 0.1944 0.0897 0.55 No, Spike on 9/18 to 0.7
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.963 0.1025 0.1237 1 None after adjustment
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.0695 0.0246 0.0128 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.822 0.3505 0.1599 0.86 No, Clear Trend up, 0.2 to 0.7 then down to 0.4
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 10/30/2013 1/17/2014 0.183 0.163 0.35 None, Data not available for entire period
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.159 0.076 0.3 None, Data not available for entire period
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 1.086 0.1316 0.089 0.55 No, Spikes on 11/1 and 12/18
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.32 0.1053 0.0538 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.633 0.4203 0.0814 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 1.03 0.5301 0.1433 0.86 No, Consistently in 0.5-0.7 Range
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 C 1/28/2014 3/10/2014 0.272 0.168 0.35 N
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.166 0.065 0.3 N
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.371 0.1088 0.0761 0.55 No, Trend Up from 0.05 to 0.25
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.322 0.0966 0.0566 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.429 0.1254 0.0945 1 No, Trend 0.3 drops to 0.06 on 2/10
Diconnect Coupling 4114 1.027 0.4398 0.167 0.86 No, High Early Trend 0.7 decreasig to 0.3 
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 4/2/2014 5/10/2014 0.183 0.094 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.157 0.041 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.517 0.2914 0.1427 0.55 No, Jump from 0.05 to 0.4 on 4/14 onward
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.809 0.5115 0.0798 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.22 0.0904 0.0199 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.656 0.4612 0.0737 0.86 None
166344
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 3/19/2014 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 1.018 0.351 0.2323 0.55 Yes, Steady Climb from .15 to 1.0
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.8 0.2383 0.0676 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 2.072 0.1392 0.2093 1 No, Spike associated with FCF on first runs
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.308 0.1361 0.0599 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 5/10/2014 7/1/2014 0.28 0.09 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.17 0.088 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.5 0.2779 0.0792 0.55 None, Spike on 4/24-4/27 to 0.45
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.16 0.0842 0.0211 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.23 0.1368 0.0249 1 None




BUNO/System RPM Phase Start Date End Date High Value Mean STD DEV Limit Trend / Consistent Exceedance
166335
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 7/22/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.442 0.285 0.0378 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.418 0.3427 0.0835 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 1.851 0.1919 0.1396 1 None, Spike to 1.8 on 4/7 then back to 0.2
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.352 0.1811 0.0622 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 9/5/2013 11/14/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.415 0.2706 0.0381 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.594 0.3115 0.0471 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.338 0.1851 0.0705 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.297 0.1736 0.048 0.86 None, Declining through period
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 C 12/4/2013 2/21/2014 0.287 0.203 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.292 0.183 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.269 0.0897 0.0436 0.55 No, Jump from .1 to .15 on 2/14
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.547 0.2726 0.0513 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.338 0.166 0.0635 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.348 0.1865 0.058 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 3/11/2014 4/8/2014 0.278 0.055 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.159 0.041 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.193 0.0907 0.0335 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.572 0.2743 0.0514 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.355 0.1739 0.0661 1 None





Aircraft System RPM Phase Start Date End Date High Value Mean STD DEV Limit Trend / Consistent Exceedance
167869
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 C 1/20/2013 8/29/2013 0.303 0.179 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.192 0.106 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.433 0.3499 0.0444 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.899 0.7507 0.0721 1 No, Trend up from .64 to .82
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.26 0.1501 0.0413 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.148 0.0746 0.0308 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 10/10/2013 2/21/2014 0.329 0.19 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.224 0.097 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.372 0.1563 0.0478 0.55 No, Spike to .28 between 2-7/2-10-14
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.567 0.354 0.0807 1 No, Trend up .3 to .5
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.361 0.2049 0.0403 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.184 0.0884 0.0297 0.86 None, trend up to .125 after 2-10-14
168394
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 2/25/2013 7/9/2013 0.13 0.09 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.11 0.083 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.47 0.2048 0.1291 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.46 0.2425 0.0441 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.54 0.338 0.0428 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.22 0.0887 0.0476 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 8/6/2013 10/17/2013 0.238 0.092 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.178 0.053 0.3 No, 1 HVR exceedance
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.078 0.013 0.0085 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.351 0.1981 0.0378 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.528 0.288 0.0576 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.192 0.0814 0.0368 0.86 None 
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 11/7/2013 3/13/2014 0.161 0.142 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.054 0.052 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.471 0.0744 0.0654 0.45 No, Spike to .2 and .3 from 11-20/11-26
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.44 0.2233 0.0572 1 No Trend
ENG Output Shaft 20900 0.508 0.3054 0.0696 1 No Trend
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.217 0.0718 0.0453 0.4 No Trend
168395
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 3/8/2013 8/6/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.181 0.0812 0.0351 0.45 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.242 0.1033 0.0315 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.54 0.3854 0.0526 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.101 0.0409 0.0203 0.4 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 9/10/2013 1/14/2014 0.257 0.049 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.273 0.173 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.176 0.052 0.0336 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.289 0.0936 0.0323 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 2.847 0.3696 0.1792 1 Yes: Spike to 2.8 on 9-25/9-29
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.116 0.0385 0.0212 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 1/28/2014 5/15/2014 0.19 0.072 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.247 0.183 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.731 0.2537 0.1739 0.55 Yes: Large Data Range, many over .45 from 4-2/4-6
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.251 0.0988 0.0331 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.519 0.3872 0.0537 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.0996 0.0329 0.0176 0.86 None
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167875
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 5/23/2013 11/12/2013 0.437 0.177 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.23 0.1 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.248 0.1656 0.0424 0.55 No, Slow Climb from .12 to .2
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.0598 0.0153 0.0075 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.534 0.3219 0.0492 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.302 0.1018 0.0563 0.86 No, Some Higher Peaks, Flucuating Trend
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 11/22/2013 3/27/2014 0.762 0.222 0.35 Yes: 3/18-3/26 (4 Flights)
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.499 0.145 0.3 Yes: 3/18-3/26 (4 Flights)
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.197 0.0748 0.0253 0.55 No, Trend Down from .15 to .08
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.251 0.1206 0.0497 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.439 0.3531 0.04 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.208 0.0942 0.0448 0.86 None
166357
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 3/24/2012 7/1/2013 0.35 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.3 N/A
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.55 N/A
20900 1 N/A
ENG Output Shaft 20900 1 N/A
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.86 N/A
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 8/1/2013 10/9/2013 0.1 0.039 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.172 0.154 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.55 N/A
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 1 N/A
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 1 N/A




Aircraft System RPM Phase Start Date End Date High Value Mean STD DEV Limit Trend / Consistent Exceedance
167859
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 D 3/22/2013 9/10/2013 0.293 0.168 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.251 0.128 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.869 0.6653 0.0956 0.55 Yes, Trend High, Adjusted Down to 0.5 Range on 9/6
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.516 0.3437 0.0508 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.521 0.28 0.0953 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.294 0.106 0.0636 0.86 No, Down from 0.2
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 A 3/3/2014 5/28/2014 0.271 0.159 0.35 None
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.205 0.052 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.205 0.0871 0.0271 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.889 0.478 0.0703 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.47 0.1473 0.035 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.251 0.0723 0.0393 0.86 None
167867
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 B 6/13/2013 11/19/2013 0.372 0.106 0.35 None, 2x single exceedance in July and September 
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.24 0.107 0.3 None
Tail Rotor 1/per 1189 0.368 0.1484 0.0633 0.55 None
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.555 0.2988 0.1096 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.195 0.1065 0.0251 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.18 0.094 0.045 0.86 None
Main Rotor 1/per vert 258 C 1/7/2014 4/10/2014 0.401 0.188 0.35 No, single exceedance
Main Rotor 1/per roll 258 0.238 0.041 0.3 None
Tail Rotor Vibes 1189 0.699 0.1327 0.0503 0.55 No, Single recording above 0.3
STBD ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.549 0.3192 0.1236 1 None
PORT ENG Input Shaft 20900 0.187 0.096 0.0295 1 None
Diconnect Coupling 4114 0.244 0.1002 0.0489 0.86 None
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